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Abstract
In. their work The Faces of Reason: An Essay on Philosophy and 
Culture in Eng-lish Canada 1850-1950, Leslie Armour and Elizabeth 
Trott consider that the Canadian way of doing philosophy uses 
reason in an accommodationist manner. I propose in this thesis that 
William Lyall's Intellect^ the Emotions and the Moral Nature 
represents a splendid example of the accommodationist use of 
reason.
The Maritimes philosopher advances the idea that emotions 
have a cognitive value, a claim which I support by trying to put 
Lyall's ideas in a modern framework offered by French philosopher 
Jean Paul Sartre. Latent in Lyall's work can also be found a theory 
of metaphor which I try to revive with the help of French 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur.
Thus, following Lyall, emotions and reason are always in a 
balance and they work together in order to give us a more 
consistent and fuller grasp of reality.
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I. WILLIAM LYALL
The two extremes in philosophizing - the highly 
ideal and the low sensational - are equally at 
fault. They both equally subject the mind to a 
kind of necessity of action, or of being acted 
upon, instead of viewing it as Being, having 
laws by which it is regulated, indeed, but 
still possessed of a free activity, a personal 
existence, and an action within itself.
William Lyall 
(1811 - 1890)
This chapter aims to give a picture of William Lyall's 
philosophical ideas. His work Intellect^ the Emotions and the Moral 
Nature (1855) can be considered an example of the accommodationist 
theory of reason, as it is developed in Leslie Armour and Elizabeth 
Trott's study of Canadian philosophy and culture. The Faces of 
Reason: An Essay on Philosophy and Culture In Eng-llsh Canada (1850 - 
1950) published in 1981 (henceforth abbreviated as Faces of Reason). 
Briefly put. Armour and Trott consider that the accommodationist use 
of reason is (or, at least, used to be in the period of time analyzed 
in their work) typical of English Canadian philosophers and it 
implies that reason is used as a means to accommodate philosophical 
positions opposed to one's own in order to learn from them. However, 
their analysis of Lyall's work does not conclude on a very happy 
note. The Maritimes professor does not seem to have brought an 
original contribution to philosophy. Moreover, he seems. Armour and 
Trott consider, to be a representative of Canadian philosophy only in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
name. My claim in this chapter is that contrary to the above 
considerations, Lyall should be taken into account in an attempt to 
configure a picture of philosophy as done in Canada. Lyall's 
particular understanding of the emotions (of the way they connect us 
with phenomenal world) and of their relationship with intellect in 
the imaginative state of mind is an original contribution which, 
however, is overlooked because it is not fully interpreted.
Lyall's philosophical ideas can be characterized as having an 
idealist streak, even though, as we will see, he rejects the sort of 
idealism that Berkeley, for example, or Hegel, practice. Moreover, 
there can be spotted in his work a tendency toward mind/body dualism 
which develops out of his struggle to meet the shortcomings of 
idealism and materialism. Following my explanation of Lyall's thought 
it will be easy to see that, if the sort of idealism described by 
Armour and Trott is indeed specific to Canadian philosophers, then 
Lyall's ideas fit their description very well.
Lyall's ideas are not easily accessible because of the 
peculiar way in which he narrows down what he thinks is worthy from 
the works of other philosophers regarding the issues that he 
analyzes. His understanding of the essential qualities of matter, 
where he "converses" with John Locke and Thomas Brown or the role 
played by emotions relative to morality, where he draws on David 
Hume's and Immanuel Kant's ideas illustrate this peculiarity.
Another issue that underlies Lyall's work is constituted by 
his proneness to using metaphorical language which is surely to be 
expected considering that he writes under the influence of the 
Romantic movement. However, this explanation is too simplistic and 
leaves undeveloped an importauit side of his work. The use of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
metaphorical language marks the existence of a preoccupation with the 
productive capacity of language. Imagination is a key term here: the 
imaginative state is the place where emotions and the intellect (in 
its ability to create metaphors) meet, where they are under each 
other's influence- This represents an important issue, because 
although Lyall considered the intellect to be divorced from 
phenomenal reality and gave emotions full credit for making us a part 
of the world (an idea which will be analyzed in the second chapter) , 
for connecting us with Nature, the intellect too should have been 
awarded this honour (this will constitute my preoccupation in the 
third chapter) .
Therefore, in this chapter, after giving a general perspective 
on Lyall's Intellect^ the Emotions and the Moral Nature I will 
analyze the part that deals with his theory of emotions and I will 
look closer at how emotions are connected with the intellect in the 
imaginative state. I will try to emphasize some of the relevant 
aspects which will become the foci of further and more detailed 
considerations which will establish more clearly Lyall's status as a 
Canadian philosopher.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
AH OVERVIEW OF WILLIAM LYALL'S PHILOSOPHY
Philosqpby in Canada
Leslie Armour and Elizabeth Trott give an interpretation of 
philosophy as it was done in Canada by stressing a special use of 
reason which can be seen at work in the musings of most English 
Canadian philosophers. In the Faces of Reason, they state:
The single point which we would make here if we 
could make only one point in this book would be 
this : Dominantly in English Canadian philosophy, 
reason is used as a device to explore 
alternatives, to suggest ways of combining 
apparently contradictory ideas, to discover new 
ways of passing from one idea to another. Only 
rarely it is used as an intellectual substitute 
for force - as a device to defeat one's opponent, 
to show his ideas to be without foundation, or to 
discredit his claims to philosophical thought.
There is, in short, a kind of philosophical 
federalism at work, a natural inclination to find 
out why one's neighbor thinks differently rather 
than to find out how to show him up as an idiot.
(1981, 4)
Thus, for Armour and Trott, many of the early Canadian philosophers 
used reason in this particular accommodationist way. They shared "a 
willingness to attempt to understand and accommodate philosophical 
positions opposed to their own" (J.D. Rabb 1986, 93) . In other words, 
the opinion of the Other counts. Dominantly, in Canada, following 
Armour and Trott's findings, the Other as such counts, whether it 
represents other human beings or Nature. It should not be dismissed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
just because it asserts something different to what is expected or it
assert itself - in as much as Nature is concerned - in rather
unexpected ways. From the description given by Armour and Trott, one 
can infer that reason is not a rigid tool dividing and structuring 
ideas while being guided by very strict rules. Reason is the catalyst 
for mediating apparent confronting positions and not the tribunal 
where conflicting ideas meet. In their book. Armour and Trott look 
for "a particular way in which reason develops as it comes to be 
substituted for insight and intuition in order that certain kinds of
conflicts might be overcome in a reasonable way" (1981, 18).
Reason, when used by Canadian philosophers, is thus seen as 
developing and as assuming different "faces", according to the 
inevitable changes that occur in either science or public awareness, 
or in its dialogue with faith or when different traditions are 
challenged. For example, John Watson saw reason as an ally in his 
concern to "develop and defend a kind of nationalism which would be 
compatible with a world order", to attenuate individualism "while 
maintaining a strong sense of human rights and liberties" (Ibid.,
512). George John Blewett uses reason in order "to find a picture of 
the world in which the world is not a mere plaything of God's and not 
a mere machine. He wants to find a view of the world within which... 
animal life comes to have a point beyond its possibilities for human 
food, clothing, and amusement" (Ibid., 514). Rupert Lodge is 
searching for "the limits of reason in order to establish a truce 
between the combatant parties so that he can create, in an 
educational setting, a common heritage while preserving a cultural 
plurality" (Ibid., 513). These examples, among many others, entitle 
Armour and Trott to come to the conclusion that in Canada, there is a
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sort of philosophical federalism at work. Armour writes in "The Faces 
of Reason and Its Critics", an article in the journal Dialogue, that:
[I]n the period which Prof. Trott and I chose, we 
find the kind of philosophical federalism which 
one might expect under the circumstances. We 
found James Beaven, perhaps something of a bigot 
before he left England, trying to find a rational 
framework within which rival kinds of Christians 
could make common cause. We found philosophers of 
the Scottish common sense tradition, like William 
Lyall, becoming much more eclectic as their lives 
wore on in Canada. (1986, 76)
There is, therefore, something distinctive about Canadian philosophy 
and there is something which gives shape to philosophical ideas 
promoted by Canadian philosophers. However, it is not my purpose here 
to argue whether the thesis sustaining Faces of Reason is legitimate 
or not. Rather, what I am interested in is to see how William Lyall's 
work fits into the framework thus provided. In other words, given 
this matrix, I want to see how Lyall's ideas develop within it and 
also how they are appreciated by Armour and Trott.
Lyall the Philosopher, Lyall the Romantic
What should be done now is to take a look at Lyall's 
philosophical background and, by surveying Intellect, the Emotions 
and the Moral Nature, to sketch his philosophical stand point.
First, let us briefly consider the context in which the book 
was written. William Lyall taught philosophy at the Free Church
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
College in Halifax, which was later to become Dalhousie University.
Armour and Trott tell us that Lyall:
had been educated first at the University of 
Glasgow and then at Edinburgh, where he 
encountered the thought of Thomas Brown which was 
to leave a lasting mark on his philosophy. For a 
time he served as a clergyman and took part of 
the Free Church in the Great Disruption of 1843.
He had a church in Linlithgow when, in 184 8, he
came to Ontario as a tutor at Knox College. Two
years later, Paxton Young replaced him at Knox 
when he decided to accept a chair at the new Free 
Church College in Halifax. The Free Church 
College of Halifax had a staff of two: Lyall, who 
served officially as Professor of Mental and 
Moral Philosophy and Classical Literature, and 
Andrew King, who was Professor of Theology. In 
fact, Lyall taught all the arts subjects. (1981,
62)
Lyall was educated in Scotland where he encountered the philosophy of 
common sense. In Canada, after two years as a tutor at Knox College, 
he moved to Halifax where he taught not only philosophy of mind and 
ethics but all arts-related subjects as well. Lyall was, as it was 
written in the Dalhousie Gazette (20 December 1893, 136), "the whole 
Faculty of Arts".
The Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature is Lyall's 
major work. It touches upon many philosophical foci as it opens with 
an analysis of the intellect followed by an inquiry into the world of 
emotions, both of them constituting a picture of the human being in 
its uniqueness. The third part is made up of reflections on moral 
nature, where the conclusions reached in the first two parts are 
joined together in an attempt to explain how human beings coexist, 
how they come together in a community. However, according to F.
Hilton Page, in William Lyall in His Settings (1980):
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Lyall's book is very much a period, piece. I do 
not say this to belittle it as I am myself rather 
partial to period—pieces, especially those of 
Lyall's own period_anyone reading Lyall's book 
now has to be aware of the conventions and 
attitudes of the time; otherwise his attention 
will be distracted from the matter to the manner 
of writing...There was a time when almost every 
Scottish professor of philosophy published his 
lectures. Volumes of lectures were almost as 
popular as volumes of sermons. To understand 
Lyall it is necessary to understand the 
peculiarities of the Scottish philosophy lecture 
of this period, on which his own lectures were, 
if unconsciously, stylistically modeled...[For 
Lyall, ]...eloquent passages; taste, culture, moral 
and spiritual elevation...[were important] . (1980,
59-61)
Though I would not say that Lyall's book merely represents a 
collection of his public lectures, this explains, to a certain 
extent, why Lyall used it as a textbook for the classes he taught; 
for a good number of years, so did teachers in several other colleges 
(Dalhousie Gazette, 30 January, 18 90) . The "eloquent passages", the 
metaphorical language intertwined with philosophical explanations as 
well as the abruptness of the presentation and the multitude of ideas 
that unexpectedly spring up here and there leaving enough space for 
details in the classroom can thus be understood. But this, I think, 
is not the only explanation for Lyall's style.
Reading Lyall is often similar to reading from the works of a 
Romantic poet. In his work, quotations from poets rival with 
quotations from philosophers. That which cannot be explained by 
reason alone, by the intellect, is often characterized by Lyall as 
something that "defies definition" or is "unexplainable" and thus is 
engulfed in an aura of mystery.
When talking about the mind, for example, in an attempt to 
revise his ideas and his findings with regard to this issue in order
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to reject the possibility that mind is merely an organic product, 
Lyall writes in the tone of idealist philosophy: the first idea one 
has is about oneself and it is followed by the one about the other 
than self, or "externality" which implies the existence of "matter 
wrapping up the mind". It follows the idea of substance, then those 
of space and time and power which become "the subjects of science". 
Science itself is something which develops, something which advances 
and mind's role "is not [to be] itself a mere law, but is conversant 
about the law"; it "is intelligent of it"; it "can unfold its own 
process or laws - is cognizant of itself".
But then, soon after talking about the mind employing concepts 
dear to the philosophy of the time, Lyall changes perspective and 
brings into discussion one of the faculties of mind, imagination and 
says that :
if we go into the region of imagination, if we 
mark the subtle process of that faculty, if we 
observe its potent sway - how it etherealizes or 
spiritualizes matter itself, clothes it in its 
own beauty, invests it in its own fair hues, 
scatters around its thousand spells, gives 
animation and meaning to every object by which we 
are surrounded, and to every sound that comes to 
us, to the lightest whisper of the breeze, and to 
the stillest rustling of the summer or the autumn 
foliage; which hears a voice in the gurgling 
brook, that comes from depths yet unfathomed by 
the mind itself, and listens in converse with the 
ocean as it murmurs unceasingly, and with 
Wordsworth, hears the sound of another ocean 
'rolling evermore' , when 'our souls have sight of 
that immortal sea which brought us hither' : who 
will say that all this is the result of mere 
organization? Who would be a materialist who has 
ever felt the visitations of that spirit which 
comes to us when nature is still, which woos us 
in the moods and aspects of creation, who has 
felt - 'A presence that disturbs him with the 
joy of elevated thoughts', who has cultivated and 
cherished that presence, and is indeed hardly 
ever unattended by it, so that it meets him in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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every pathway where the influences of nature are 
around him? (1855, 93-94)
Mind, therefore, according to Lyall, is not a product, is not "an 
organic result"; it is different from matter. The philosophical 
inquiry, guided by reason, as well as the emotions one experiences 
under imagination' s spell bring us to the same conclusion which is 
that matter is not all there is and that the mind is not merely a 
product of it. This is, though, just an example among others.
As Lyall sees it then, metaphors and concepts work together for 
the benefit of a better explanation. A  connection between philosophy 
and poetry is something which often develops in the Romantic period. 
Gilles Deleuze, in one of his lectures about Kant (1978), advances 
the radical idea that we never find those who understand philosophers 
among philosophers. In Kant's case, his best disciple was none other 
than Hblderlin. Time for Kant, to give an example, ceases to have a 
psychological or cosmological connotation. It becomes a pure form; it 
is not something that unfolds circularly but rather something that 
stretches itself, linearly. This kind of time is the pure and empty 
form in which, Deleuze claims, HOlderlin's Oedipus wanders. There is 
then an intimate connection between the findings of philosophy and 
poetic effusiveness.
But how is this related to Lyall? Is Lyall's affluence of 
poetic language intertwined with philosophical arguments a mere proof 
of his writing for the sake of an audience, for the sake of eloquent, 
though scholarly presentations? Is it proof of his being an incurable 
Romantic? Or does it imply something more than that? Can it be that 
his efforts were directed toward an attempt to unpack Romantic themes 
and common places in a philosophical milieu thus feeding the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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philosophical reflection itself with meanings revealed by poetic 
creation? I think this question deserves an affirmative answer.
In sum, with Lyall, philosophical reason and poetic imagination 
meet; with Lyall, reason and emotion join hands and create a balance. 
This way, reason is not used as the one and only true philosophical 
tool, which is an idea that underlines the thesis sustaining Armour 
and Trott's Faces of Reason, that is, reason is used by English 
Canadian philosophers in an accommodationist mainner.
Lyall's Method
Let us now take a closer look at the content of the Intellect, 
the Emotions and the Moral Nature in order to illustrate what I 
called at the beginning of this chapter Lyall's peculiar way of 
retaining what is useful from the works of other philosophers.
Lyall's ideas were developed in close connection to the Scottish 
philosophy of common sense. He studied thoroughly Locke, Reid,
Carlyle and, especially, Thomas Brown, as well as Descartes, Kant and 
Fichte. His way of dealing with things can be reduced to sorting and 
clarifying intuitions, "which are basic certainties which are given 
to us" (Armour/Trott 1981, 66), in order to integrate them into a 
coherent pattern. Once at this point, he re-examines the 
philosophical situation to see what other, new intuitions come to 
light. Lyall "tends to state a thesis, and then qualify it, qualify 
it some more, and then qualify it still further. After several pages 
of such qualifications we discover that he does not hold the original
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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thesis at all" (J.D.Rabb, 1990). For example, this is Lyall talking 
about the essential qualities of matter: he starts by saying that "we 
have thus, then, arrived at the essential properties of matter. These 
are extension, divisibility, solidity or fluidity, hardness or 
softness, and figure" (Lyall 1855, 47). Then, like Locke, he clearly 
distinguishes between these essential, or primary qualities and the 
secondary qualities such as color, sound, fragrance, heat or cold, 
sweetness or bitterness which "do not enter into our idea of matter". 
There is nothing surprising up to here. Other philosophers worked 
with this distinction in the European philosophical tradition. When 
one would expect that he is happy with the framework, he actually 
goes further, turning to the thought of his former teacher, the 
Scottish common sense philosopher Thomas Brown. With Brown's help, he 
manages to change the "bundle" of properties with which he started: 
"According to Dr. Brown, himself, extension and resistance are the 
only two qualities which can invariably be predicated about matter; 
for figure and magnitude are modifications of extension, - as 
solidity and fluidity, hardness and softness, are of resistance" 
(Ibid., 48). Therefore, from the original list or primary qualities - 
extension, divisibility, solidity or fluidity, hardness or softness, 
and figure, we are now down to just two - extension and resistance.
At least this new qualification should satisfy Lyall. After all, how 
much further can he go? But he does not stop even here. "Dr. Brown 
has reduced the primary qualities to these two. They may be reduced 
still further, viz., to resistance, for extension is rather a 
property of space than that of matter" (Ibid., 48).
As C3U1 be seen, Lyall continuously qualifies his findings and 
this implies that a great deal of attention is required in order to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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get the correct position that he maintains. This is Lyall's manner of 
presentation throughout the Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral 
Nature.
Lyall's Understanding of the Intellect
Now let us see what Lyall thinks about how knowledge is 
gained, what the role of the intellect is and that of sensation in 
this enterprise. Reading the first part of the Intellect, the 
Emotions and the Moral Nature, one can be surprised by the struggle 
Lyall goes through in the attempt to explain how sensation becomes 
knowledge, how reality becomes idea. All this leads one further to 
think that he will not give up easily when it comes to the actual 
existence of the physical world. He cannot concede to materialism, 
because, on his view, materialism is "the proper spawn of too great 
an engrossment in mere matter, whether it be in the too exclusive 
devotion to the business and pursuit of life, or too entire an 
attention to the physical and mechanical sciences" (Ibid., 89).
On the other hand, he does not subscribe completely to
idealist views either, because he continuously speaks about the world 
outside and the existence of both sensation and intellect. "It is a
marvelous connexion which exists between the world without and the
world within" (Ibid., 102). The mind cannot work without the data 
which sensation provides it. There are places in the first third of 
his book where he can be perceived as nothing but a mind/body 
dualist and not an idealist at all. "Mind and matter are the two
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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substances about which all philosophy is converssuit. These two 
substances may be said to divide the universe" (Ibid., 13). Moreover, 
he repeatedly claims that:
Mind cannot be an organic result. True, sensation 
is partly material and the difficulty of deciding
where the material part of the process or
phenomenon stops, and the mental part begins, may 
be urged in favor of materialism; but sensation
is not all the phenomena of mind, and while we
confess a difficulty, we still mark the total 
difference between a material and a mental 
product.(Ibid., 92)
Hence, Lyall disapproves of both the extreme materialism of "extreme 
sensationalists", as he calls them, and the transcendetalism of the
"extreme idealists". Rather, he finds a middle path between the two
more satisfying. In order to prove his point, he distinguishes 
between intellection, which is "the action of the mind as mind" and 
sensation which is "partly corporeal and partly a mental function or 
state" (Ibid., 102). Thus, in the presence of certain sensations, the 
mind produces ideas like those of matter, substance, space and time,
etc. Through them we gain knowledge of the external world. These
ideas rest upon existing things in the phenomenal world; there is 
more to the world than pure ideas as there is more to it than pure 
sensations. The intellect provides us with scientific knowledge which 
develops on the presupposition that there is a material world.
However, for Lyall, the intellect is not the only source of 
knowledge. Let us recall Lyall's manner of presentation: he states a 
thesis and then qualifies it in order to find out what new intuitions 
come to light. The same approach is used when talking about the 
intellect: he assumes and acknowledges the implications of his 
statements and then he proclaims that the intellect is not the only
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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important element when it comes to explaining the way we gain 
knowledge. There is something else that also contributes to our 
understanding of the world. The intellect operates "from a distance", 
it is "wholly divorced from the physical world".
Lyall appears to be an idealist but not of the German kind nor 
of the kind professed by Berkeley since as we said earlier, he was 
very much against both of them. Lyall's idealism fits within the 
framework of a distinctive Canadian idealism which has as its most 
important particularity the search for a balance, for an equilibrium 
which will not be exclusive but rather accommodationist; in this 
case, a balance between reason and emotion. What I am talking about 
here is that Lyall finds necessary the use of another sort of reason 
apart from pure reason namely, practical reason.
For Lyall, practical reason is what completes our interaction 
with the world. It refers to our moral nature and to our emotions. 
Unlike the intellect, the knowledge gained through the use of 
practical reason is indubitable and reveals to us our true nature as 
moral agents and our obligations to others. Lyall writes :
There is a practical power in the sentiment. It 
has an authoritative voice within us which makes 
us feel our relation to being, and such relations 
as we dare not disregard. It is here that 
consciousness cannot be mistaken. There can be no 
discussion about the truthfulness of its 
intimations. The feeling within now is such that 
no dubiety rests upon it; it is practical, 
overwhelming. There is reality here if nowhere 
else. We have got out of the world of shadows 
into the world of realities - of mere 
consciousness into authoritative consciousness 
which speaks aloud, which enforces itself, which 
does not admit for a moment of questioning, which 
will not allow debate or parleying, which unites 
us in relations not to be broken with our fellow- 
beings, while it makes us realize to ourselves 
our own substantive existence and importance.
(Ibid., 469)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The claim that practical reason is indubitable cannot be easily 
explained without first understanding how emotions work and how they 
work in connection to moral nature. Lyall recognizes the importance 
of the intellect in the process of acquiring knowledge but he still 
thinks that, by itself, the intellect is useless. It presents us with 
a picture of reality which is not different from the one Plato offers 
in the Cave myth, in the Republic. Lyall pictures phenomenal reality 
as having the same constitution as the shadows on the walls of 
Plato's Cave. However, unlike Plato, he considers these shadows to be 
the fabric from which the intellect tailors the phenomenal reality, a 
reality, though, which cannot be reached, which exists "out there", 
which can only be analyzed and dissected as a corpse in a laboratory. 
Lyall writes that :
[t]he intellectual part of our nature is a 
surpassing mystery - those processes by which 
the mind becomes all light, opens to idea of 
itself and the outer world of the universe, puts 
upon all that is external or internal its forms, 
while these forms have their counterpart without, 
or in the inner self, constructs science, and 
makes its own processes the subject of its 
investigation - but marvelous as this is, there 
are mysteries of our nature far greater than 
these and the intellectual part may be said to be 
the least wonderful of our compound being. (Ibid.,
279)
The intellect, therefore, is an important constituent of our nature, 
but it is not the most important one. The intellect alone is not able 
to give us a proper account of reality. It needs the input of 
emotions.
Thus, we have seen that Lyall does not want to concede to 
either idealism or materialism. Instead, he wants to bring them to
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an equilibrium and he does that by claiming that emotions should be 
given their due.
Emotion*, Morality and. Being
After writing almost three hundred pages on the intellect 
and its functions, Lyall goes further and analyzes the emotions. 
The intellect loses its glamour and this is because the emotions 
come onto the scene. Without them, human beings would not be 
capable of action and action is that which make us what we really 
are. Actions are the way we assert ourselves in the world and 
become part of it. What Lyall seems to think is that the intellect 
has the capability to reflect upon any possible situation but 
without action it would not be different from what we would call 
today a powerful computer. Without action, human beings would live 
as if surrounded by a glass bubble. But actions themselves 
originate in the will and emotion is that which "provides us with 
the initial impetuous to action" (Armour/Trott 1981, 7 6} .
Lyall claims that "emotion is a higher state than pure 
intellect" (Lyall 1855, 284). This is a serious affirmation and it 
has implications in his theory of moral nature. Prima facie, it 
looks as if he is going in the same direction as Hume on this 
point. "Hume and those who follow him treat emotions as 
essentially feelings ('affects' or 'impressions') with thoughts 
incidentally attached"(Neu 1977, 1). For Lyall,"[the] moral 
element comes from the region of duty, and may mingle with our
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emotions, but the emotions themselves are distinguishable from, 
that element, and are capable of separate consideration" (Ibid., 
285) . By saying that emotions are capable of separate 
consideration Lyall seems to reach conclusions very close to those 
of Hume. He says that the mind can recognize without a shade of 
doubt a distinction between rightness and wrongness. It does that 
with the same ease as it does when it has to distinguish between, 
say, two categories, or two numbers. But things get complicated 
when the question why? arises. "Can we explain why it is right, or 
why it is wrong - give any reasons for pronouncing it so? Now, it 
would seem that no account or explanation of this can be given, 
but that we perceive at once the quality of rightness or wrongness 
apart from any such explanation" (Ibid., 487).
Does Lyall's account of morality not sound like Hume's? After 
all, Hume is giving significant credit to emotions too. In his 
Treatise of Human Nature (1967) he argues that the role of reason 
in moral decisions is very limited and that moral approval is only 
a feeling in the mind of the person that makes a moral judgment. 
"Actions, he says, may be laudable or blamable, but they cannot be 
reasonable or unreasonable" (Hume 1967, 4 58) . There are several 
arguments which Hume brings forth to sustain his position. The 
first one is that reason involves only judgments about reality, 
but when one examines the content of a moral action, one does not 
have to deal with a fact. The only thing that is there is just a 
feeling. Moreover, moral pronouncements are closer to our way of 
experiencing aesthetic pronouncements, which are also feelings, 
and they are nowhere close to rational judgments. One could think 
that moral pronouncements develop in a similar manner to logical
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and mathematical reasoning. But Hume argues that while in the 
disciplines of logic and mathematics we begin with known facts and 
discover a new, unknown fact, in the discipline of ethics, all the 
relevant facts must be known from the beginning.
Besides, according to Hume, moral actions are done with the 
sole purpose of happiness and, insofar as happiness is the goal, 
reason has to step aside. "Morality, therefore, is more properly 
felt than judged of; though this feeling or sentiment is commonly so 
soft and gentle that we are apt to confound it with an idea, 
according to our common custom of taking all things for the same, 
which have any near resemblance to each other" (Ibid., 470). The 
foregoing is a summary of what Hume has to say on this subject. But 
it does not exactly fit Lyall's framework. Towards the end of the 
second chapter of his work, where he is talking about emotions, Lyall 
notes that :
Man is not only a mere being, he is a moral 
being; has not only a place in creation, but has 
a part to perform in creation: he not only lives, 
and thinks, and feels - he wills - and not only 
wills, but wills according to a law of right and 
wrong. And this law is not arbitrary, it is 
eternal; it is not imposed, it is a part of his 
very nature. It belongs to every moral being, 
enters into the essence of a moral constitution.
It is the law of duty, the law of right and 
wrong, a law of eternal and abstract 
propriety.(Lyall 1855, 468)
This time, it seems that Lyall moves a long way apart from Hume. But, 
let us not forget Lyall's manner of presentation: he states a 
position even though, in this case, he does not say clearly that this 
particular position is Hume's, and then, he qualifies it. But he does 
not stop there: he qualifies it again.
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With this new qualification, Lyall is "talking" with Kant amd 
his ideas about moral duty which arises out of the reverence for law. 
He goes further in analyzing the meaning of the word "reverence" and 
how it is connected with the concept of "duty" and that of "law". For 
Kant, an action performed out of duty "has to be done irrespective of 
all appetite whatsoever". Virtue is deprived of any trace of feeling 
and it is entirely subjected to the law. But, according to Lyall:
what I apprehend to be my law, I recognize to be 
so with reverence, which word denotes merely the 
consciousness of the immediate, unconditional, 
and unreserved subordination of my will to the 
law. The immediate determination of the will by 
the law, and the consciousness of it, is called 
reverence, and is regarded not as the cause but 
as the effect of the law upon the person. (Ibid.,
509)
Thus, for Lyall, the will is determined and subordinated to the law. 
The same position is supported by Kant and, after what happened with 
Lyall's appropriation of Hume's position, first explaining it and 
then qualifying it, one might think that this Kantian qualification 
will satisfy him. But this does not seem to be the case either! Kant 
too is wrong. Why? According to Armour and Trott:
Lyall admires the formal aspect of Kant's moral 
theory. But this formal element is not, in his 
view, sufficient to account for morality. For we 
need to be impelled toward specific acts and 
outcomes. One can be determined to act coherently 
only if one is determined to act at all. And one 
must enjoy, amongst possible actions the choice 
already guaranteed by the open-textured ambiguity 
of the stimulus-response situation created by the 
nature of our emotions. Thus, a rule like Kant's 
categorical imperative - 'act only on a maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that 
it should become a universal law' - is not 
sufficient. The gap, in part, is filled by the 
original moral emotion which appears to us as a 
moral intuition. (1981, 77, my italics)
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Lyall accuses Kant of not admitting love to be a part of reverence. 
His almost instinctive reaction is to think that in all reverence 
there must be a certain degree of love, otherwise the reverence would 
be "mere fear". For Lyall,
it would seem to be necessary, in order to moral 
approbation being real, that there should be love 
as well as reverence for the law: it would be 
otherwise a distant reverence, not approval: 
there would be assent to the rightness of the 
law, not approbation. Distant reverence is at 
most a cold feeling, and it is not properly 
approbation till there is love. (Lyall 1855,
510)
Love is what Kant lacks in his account of morality. Lyall emphasizes 
greatly the concept of love. Love is the most essential emotion, love 
is that which connects us to the other, love is that which discovers 
a being for us. Love, next to sympathy, benevolence and gratitude, is 
one of the emotions which "terminate on being". Love has as its 
object Being but Lyall does not spend time explaining what he means 
by using the word "Being". It would seem that for Lyall Being 
expresses that which has a real existence. The world, for the 
Maritimes philosopher, is not a collection of sensations. It meets 
our gaze organized into things which stand apart, detached from their 
surroundings. Hence, there can be talk about love not only with 
regard to fellow humans but also love for Nature and everything that 
pertains to Nature. The only difference, Lyall thinks, is that the 
emotion of love increases proportionally with the purity of its 
object. Love of God is the absolute on the scale of which Lyall is 
thinking. "Moral and intellectual qualities give an immense increase 
to emotions", he writes (Ibid., 410). Moreover, he claims that:
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we know that inanimate objects even may awaken 
our love, a kind of attachment, and this may be 
distinguished from the delight or pleasure which 
they give us; the one is delight In the object, 
the other is delight produced by the object. The 
former, then, is just love; and to say that love 
is delight in an object, or in the contemplation 
of that object, is to describe the emotion by 
itself. (Ibid., 392)
Such are, on Lyall's account, the implications that emotions have on 
morality. Now, we have seen that emotions (and more particularly the 
emotion of love) complete our "interaction" with what we call "the 
real" while the intellect could not go further than scientific 
understanding.
Lyall sensed that there is something left out of the scientific 
account of reality and only the emotions could connect us with it. 
Pure reason has to work together with practical reason in order to 
give us the complete picture of reality. Why? Because practical 
reason, unlike pure reason refers to the very being of what exists in 
Nature, of another human or of God. As J.D. Rabb explains in his 
Silver Jubilee lecture:
The emotion of love is a source of knowledge.
Nature herself 'is animated, intelligent, full of 
sentiment' . This is the idealistic insight 
concealed from us by our narrow reliance on the 
intellect as our source of knowledge. Yet for 
Lyall the intellect is still important. It too is 
a source of knowledge. He devotes the first third 
of the book to it and to the characteristics of 
the material world it reveals. Unlike the 
Romantic poets or other ethical idealists,
Lyall's idealism neither ignores nor diminishes 
as unimportant the findings of science. (1990)
Yet, the intellect, being "divorced" from the phenomenal world, being 
unrelated to the objects of the physical world, cannot build a bridge 
between us and the other-than-us. This is the task of emotion.
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Emotion is "the atmosphere of mind; it is its vital breath" (Lyall 
1855, 284). In Lyall's picture of the human mind, the emotions, 
"initially, are directed to objects in the world and, by reason of 
their connection to the secondary objects which are states of mind, 
they provide the background for the intellect" (Armour /Trott 1981,
76) . This is why emotions are a source of knowledge and this is why 
we are able to see nature as "animated" and "full of sentiment".
Lyall affirms that Nature, in a sense, resonates to our emotions and 
our emotions are in tune with Nature. In as much as we are sentient 
beings we resonate with Nature. The intellect does not have any means 
to reach the phenomenal reality with all its complexity. But, 
fortunately, we connect with Nature through our emotions and thus we 
are able to provide the intellect something with which to work, we 
are able to gain knowledge of reality and understand it.
In sum, we have seen that Lyall rejects the kind of idealism 
which stems from Berkeley's theory of ideas where the only thing that 
exists and that we are certain of is the mind. But this does not 
reflect well on Lyall. He could have criticized him by following 
either Hume and consequently, falling into skepticism, or Kant which 
he does not because he rejects part of Kant's ideas also. How then 
can Lyall's position be explained? The thing which might explain it 
is that Lyall became aware of the importance of Nature. His stay in 
Canada must have influenced him. He wants to say that, doubtless, 
Berkeley was wrong. Nature exists! Physical objects exist! This is 
what Lyall does : he finds out that the power of the intellect is 
limited but he does not desert the post. In order to have that piece 
of knowledge the mind needs but cannot get through the intellect, 
Lyall requests help from the emotions. Emotions can give us knowledge
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about the world. Love is the emotion which unveils Being. Certainly, 
this emphasis on love and emotion would sound very strange for 
Berkeley and it would be strange for Kant as well. Hume would not 
have expected this turning point. But it seems natural to Lyall. 
Therefore, if there is anything that is worthwhile in Lyall's work it 
is his emphasis on the cognitive value of emotions which is an 
overlooked aspect of his philosophy because it was not fully 
interpreted.
William Lyall's philosophical work then is not just a 
"patchwork quilt" of foreign ideas, as Armour and Trott claim (Ibid., 
79) . It is original, moreover, original in a Canadian way. J.D. Rabb 
recognizes that "His work is a splendid example of what Armour and 
Trott have called the accommodationist use of reason, of 
philosophical federalism" (1990) . By classifying Lyall as an eclectic 
and by not investigating thoroughly his attitude to emotion. Armour 
and Trott felt entitled to accord him only a minor role in the 
general picture of philosophy done in Canada. It is not my intention 
to say that Lyall put a distinctive mark on the philosophical 
pantheon of ideas. But he did, most certainly, realize that in order 
to do philosophy at least in that part of the world, one must have 
open not only a rational eye, but an emotional eye as well.
The only thing lacking in Lyall, in the formulation and 
affirmation of his ideas, is confidence. The silent echo of a non­
existent tradition springs through the chasms of the chapters of his 
work. He was an exile. He was supposed to feel at home, but he did 
not and he could not since his philosophical home was overseas in 
Scotland. Instead, he was in Canada trying to build his own shelter. 
He knew how to do it but he had to do it making use of what he was
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offered there. And that, as J.D. Rabb recognizes in his Jubilee 
lecture, was Nature:
In so far as Lyall's idealism is concerned what 
is important, indeed crucial, is his claim, not 
merely that we can sympathize with nature, but 
rather that the emotion of sympathy can actually 
animate nature. Here he begins to sound more like 
a romantic poet than a rationalist philosopher: 
'There is something in the voice of a brook which 
stirs the innermost emotions of the soul, placid, 
steady, deep; in the sigh of the wind; in the 
dash of the ocean; in the sunshine and gloom; in 
calm and tempest: our mind feels in all, has an 
emotion corresponding to each. Such is the law, 
such is the power of sympathy. What power does it 
exert in uniting society! What a bond of 
connection! What an amalgamating principle! And 
through it nature itself is animated, 
intelligent, full of sentiment, and the inspirer 
of the finest, and the most delightful, sometimes 
the most exalted emotions' (Lyall 1885, 461-462). 
(1990)
Not surprisingly, Lyall's development of ideas takes place abruptly. 
There is not a smooth flow of philosophical thought. He tries to set 
new views, but he does that in as an yet un-explored territory. The 
school he comes from, the school of Scottish philosophy, enjoys the 
richness of a tradition which did not exist in Canada, but whose 
existence was felt necessary. A tradition cannot come into being by 
using borrowed elements but only by using its own resources. A 
tradition is necessary because without it nothing can be labeled as 
new. Novel ideas cannot be recognized as new if there are no other 
terms to which they can be compared.
For Lyall, to use the traditional philosophical language and 
concepts of Western philosophy seems a seductive temptation. But they 
do not work any longer since the attitude toward the given of 
analysis has changed. This change explains the aura of eclecticism
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surrounding Lyall's work. A certain philosophical tradition can only 
be reached when it gets to the point of finding a particular new form 
of communication. It finds its own identity when it develops a more 
free and efficient means of relating to the other traditions. It is 
only then that thought can follow its essential and natural 
questions.
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INIELLECT, EMOTIONS AMD IMAGINATION
Now, after providing an outline of Lyall's work, the next 
thing I will do is examine more closely his ideas about the cognitive 
value of emotions and about their connection with the intellect in 
the imaginative state. Thus, understanding Lyall's classification of 
emotions, as well as understanding how emotions work, how they build 
the bridge between reality and the emotional being, will constitute 
my focus throughout the concluding section of this chapter. The fact 
that Lyall uses metaphors throughout his exposition will be 
emphasized in what follows because it is my contention that Lyall's 
understanding of emotions and metaphors as being connected and how 
they merge together in the imaginative state of mind are of central 
importance in comprehending his philosophy.
For Lyall, the intellect is "but a part of his [man's] 
compound being, and not [even] the most inç>ortant part". Lyall talks 
about the mind as having two dimensions. He draws on the Cartesian 
conception that the mind's essence is thinking but he brings into 
discussion the Lockean view that thinking is the "action of the soul" 
and not its proper essence. This compels him to adopt a more balanced 
position with regard to this issue. "Thinking and feeling, however, 
are the two states of mind in which, if it exists in a state of 
consciousness at all, it must exist" (Lyall 1855, 289). They are 
distinct and they do not interact in the sense that one of them 
cannot be the master of the other. One's thought can provoke one to
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have an emotion and, as well, an emotion is "the great prompter and 
enkindler of thought" (Ibid., 290). This meains that both thinking and 
having emotions share the same honours, in as much as one is not the 
master of the other. Thoughts and emotions are bound together. The 
mind, as long as it is self-conscious, is also emotional. "Some one 
emotion or other, it may be said, is occupying or filling the mind 
every moment of its conscious existence" (Ibid., 290). It seems that 
Lyall is situated, once again, on conciliatory ground. He does not 
side with Plato and thus consider the intellect and the emotion as 
opposite with one, the intellect, being the master of the other; or 
with Hume where the emotion becomes the master and reason its slave. 
But this should not be a surprise, since we have seen that his work 
is a "splendid example of the accommodationist use of reason".
Lyall's definition of emotion is drawn from analogy. An 
emotion is a movement of the mind, consequent upon some moving cause. 
Regarding the emotion as a movement of the mind is an artifice based 
on the analogy of the mind with the body: "there is some analogy 
between motion of the body, or of any material substance, and this 
phenomenon of the mind, as there is an analogy between an act of the 
body and the acts of the will or the intellect" (Ibid., 286). Thus, 
in defining emotion as a movement of the mind, Lyall makes use of the 
metaphor, bringing together two remote terms ("emotion" and 
"movement") to try to give a description of "emotion". But he is 
quick to draw attention to the fact that emotion cannot be an "act" 
of mind because the only "active power" (again, another metaphor) of 
the mind is the will. This "movement" of the mind, Lyall recognizes, 
is something different than an act of the mind:
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By an act of will, or an impulse from some 
foreign body, our limbs, or our whole bodies, are 
put in motion; and in the same way, by an act of 
will, or the impulse of other bodies, bodies 
other and foreign to ourselves are put in motion. 
There is impulse and motion. Now, in the 
phenomena of emotion, there is something like 
impulse, amd the emotion of the mind is the 
consequence. An emotion is thus, more properly, 
any feeling of the mind suddenly inspired or 
produced; it is the feeling either in its first 
and sudden excitement, or the same feeling 
considered in relation to that first or sudden 
impulse or excitement. We call It a feeling, or, 
perhaps, an affection of the mind when it is not 
considered with relation to this impulse or 
excitement, but regarded in its continuous 
existence or exercise. Thus, love or admiration 
when awakened by any object, is an emotion; when 
continuous, it is an affection. (Ibid., 286)
Here Lyall draws a distinction between feeling (or affection) and 
emotion. The difference between the two is rooted in the difference 
between abruptness and continuous flow. When the state of an 
emotional person is precipitously altered by the object of emotion we 
are dealing with an emotion. When the altered state persists, then we 
are dealing with feelings. Moreover, an affect has a connotation of 
passivity. One is affected or being acted upon rather than acting.
The common use of language corroborated with Lyall's proneness to 
continuously qualify his findings, compels him to disregard this 
distinction. He asserts that, when using the term "emotion" we also 
extend it to feelings because originally it regards the sudden rise 
of emotion.But this, by no means, should narrow the usage of the 
word. Thus, the emotions "take over" feelings and Lyall considers 
himself justified in writing that "the emotions are just the 
feelings"(Ibid., 287). Now is this new "qualification", this new 
achievement a legitimate one? On the one hand, it makes sense if one 
takes into account Lyall's desire to "stay in the domain of common
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sense". But on the other hand, it diminishes the clarity of his 
exposition. Lyall is guilty of leaving things unexplained and 
considering that nuances are not relevant. As observed by Armour and 
Trott: "One would suppose that his system could, in this respect, be 
tidied" (1981, 74). If Lyall were concerned with the use of ordinary 
language and the fact that the term "emotion" got to the point where 
it can be used interchangeably with the term "feeling", he would have 
discovered that this term denotes different things in different 
contexts. Feeling words are not always employed in the same way, as 
one can see in examples like "I feel that this is the right way" and 
"I feel pain" or "I feel bad".
Moreover, there is another set of problems that arise when 
emotion is defined on the basis of an analogy with the "motion" of 
the body which implies that we have, more or less, an analogy with 
the phenomenon of sensation. This means that Lyall gives an account 
of emotions in terms of sense perception which does not hold very 
well for various reasons: in the first place, sense perception 
implies the existence of an organ of perception. But this is not true 
with regard to emotions. There is no organ for sensing the emotions.
A question like "What organ do you use when you feel sad?" is 
nonsense. Also, the objects and state of affairs in sense perception 
exist independently of them being perceived. Can that be said about 
emotions? Can one have an emotion without Icnowing that one has that 
emotion? Can one also have an emotion without knowing which one it 
is, or genuinely mistaken about it? Perhaps we can as it happens when 
we are angry without knowing it. We seem cjuite readily deceived, 
self-deceived, and also willing and able to deceive others about it. 
However, Lyall does not show any interest in attacking this problem.
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Moreover, sense perception involves perception of the 
intrinsic, non-relational properties of the objects perceived. Is 
that true about emotions? Warren Shibles in his book on Emotion 
(1974) distinguishes emotions from feelings on the following basis:
Because emotions involve cognition they can be 
shared, whereas, feelings cannot be shared.
Sympathy involves having similar feelings or 
understanding another's feelings. Feelings do not 
have objects as emotions do. 'I enjoy golf' and 
'I enjoy a feeling', but 'pain' in 'I feel pain' 
is not an object of the feeling but the feeling 
itself. One can enjoy a feeling but it is a 
category mistake to say he feels an enjoyment. If 
emotion were a feeling then it would seem that 
physical irritations and pains would have to be 
regarded as emotions. They are not. (1974, 143)
Thus, feelings and emotions are different. Shibles pointed out that 
feelings may be part of what we mean by emotion. "They may precede, 
coexist with or follow cognition" (Ibid., 141). But this does not 
imply that there is a relation of identity between feelings and 
emotions. Of course, one can reply to this that William James has 
built his theory of emotions on the supposition that emotions are 
feelings. For James, emotions are nothing but internal bodily 
sensations, that is, "the feelings or subjective sensible aspects of 
physiological occurrences caused by perceptions" (Lyons 1980, 14).
However, unlike James, Lyall sketches a distinction between 
feeling and emotion and then abandons it, leaving it undeveloped. 
Defining emotion by making use of the analogy with the "motion" of 
the body, Lyall does not raise the kind of questions asked above and 
thus, he fails to investigate a very rich area which would otherwise 
cast a brighter light on the issue he wants to analyze. But even if 
he does not make the distinction very clear, he does not fall into
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the fallacy of ambiguity, reasoning now about emotions and then about 
feelings.
However, Lyall does distinguish between emotion and passion 
and between emotion and desire. Lyall describes emotion by comparing 
it to passion: "Emotion is generic. Passion is specific [...] Passion 
is but a stronger emotion [...] The desires are distinct states of 
mind. They may be accompanied with emotions, but they are not 
emotions" (Lyall 1855, 287). It seems that emotions are, as he said, 
quite generic. If any "movement of the mind" can be translated into 
emotion then we are under its spell for the majority of time. Indeed, 
if "the first essential condition of emotion would seem to be one of 
calm amd placid enjoyment" and if this "might be taken as the first 
essential state of emotion" then "the balance of all the emotions 
would seem to require or necessitate a calm and settled state"
(Ibid., 291). Anything disturbing this balance, this settled state, 
is an emotion but, in as much as emotion is "the movement of the mind 
consequent upon some moving cause" it means that there must be an 
impulse which acts like a cause. The cause or the impulse is 
represented by the feeling which, as we saw above, is the "first and 
sudden excitement of the mind". This excitement of the mind occurs in 
the presence of the object of the emotion. What then constitutes the 
object of the emotion?
For Lyall, emotions have two sorts of objects. There are 
direct and indirect objects. Thus, on one hand, when one loves 
somebody, when one is depressed about something, etc. we are dealing 
with direct objects. On the other hand, when the state of mind which 
"the emotion produces or the outcomes of the actions stimulated by 
the emotions" (Armour/Trott 1981, 75) are involved, we are dealing
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with indirect objects. Armour and Trott explain. Examples of emotions 
awakened by a direct object are: delight, wonder, surprise and 
astonishment, admiration and adoration. Delight, for example, is 
produced by "every object that can minister to our enjoyment, that 
can give us happiness, that affords us pleasure" (Lyall 1855, 348). 
Wonder, is "that emotion which is awakened on the contemplation of 
something great, or by what is extraordinary, and out of the usual 
course of experience or observation" (Ibid., 358) . A  meteor in the
sky, or "some phenomenon upon earth, which has never been seen
before", or something that does not fit our ordinary, day to day 
occurrences, induces us to experience the emotion of wonder.
Melancholy, sorrow, joy etc. are emotions which do not occur 
as a result of the interaction with a direct object. Rather, these 
emotions rest on one's self awareness. Thus, in Lyall's account of
emotion it is the case that:
We live in events and we are connected with 
objects [„.] The events and circumstances that 
transpire daily, or that are ever arising, 
produce joy or sorrow, or excite fretfulness and
impatience, or are lit up with the calm and the
sunshine of cheerfulness, or again are steeped in
the sombre shades of melancholy. The daily 
history of every individual is made up of these
events, these circumstances and they awaken such
and such emotions in the breast; and thus the 
tissue of life consists of those events without, 
and these emotions within. (Ibid., 346-347)
Sorrow, for example, arises out of our thoughts about death. "Death", 
writes Lyall making use of metaphorical constructions, "is the grim 
tyrant that shakes his sceptre over every individual of our race, and 
that will claim all for his dominion or his prey. We must bow our
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heads in death, and the tribute of sorrow we have paid to others may 
be rendered to us" (Ibid., 340).
There are, however, two exceptions to the rule of emotions not 
occurring as a result of interaction with a direct object. The first 
one - if "cheerfulness is the harmony of all emotions" (Ibid., 303), 
as Lyall writes, then this implies that cheerfulness does not exactly 
have an object. It is, as it was said earlier, the condition of all 
emotions, their balance. It is not that, when being cheerful, one 
lacks emotion. For Lyall, the mind, at all times, is informed by one 
emotion or another. In the cheerful state, all the emotions are 
active but they are active in such a way that they counteract each 
other so they make possible a balance. Lyall writes that:
In the equilibrium of the atmosphere, all the 
elements seem to be at rest, and yet, they are 
all in harmonious action. When a balance is in 
equilibrium, neither of the sides seem to be in 
action; and yet it is because both are in action 
equally that the equilibrium is produced, or 
there is a rest on the point of equilibrium. So 
is it with emotions. None may be said to be in 
action, and yet all may be said to be in action, 
or capable of action, and only await the call for 
them at the proper time, or in their proper 
place. (Ibid., 303)
Thus, cheerfulness, being the harmony of all emotions actually lacks 
a specific object.
The second exception is represented by the emotion of love. "A 
thing loved". Armour and Trott explain, "is loved for its own sake. 
Since its ultimate sustaining object must be something which can be 
loved for its own sake and not for the sake of an indirect object, 
love, combined with intellectual understanding, must lead on to the
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only tiling actually capable of sustaining love for its own sake.
That, in Lyall's view, is being itself" (1981, 75).
Since he views love as the most powerful emotion, Lyall 
dedicates numerous pages to it where he talks about different kinds 
of love; maternal love, filial love, love for country, erotic love, 
etc., about different degrees of it, and about love in its 
absoluteness. He starts in an Augustinian vein writing, more or less, 
that at the beginning there was love. "Love may be contemplated as an 
absolute emotion existing even apart from an object to exercise it or 
call it forth. It is a state conceivable prior to the existence of 
any being to call it forth. God was love in this absolute sense" 
(Lyall 1855, 405). Everything that exists is an object of God's love. 
Every human being, everything that is endowed with life, as well as 
every tree and every stone, every grass leaf, came to being as an 
exercise of God's love. Love is that which binds us all together. "We 
feel that we can regard with a kind of affection even inanimate 
objects; that our love, the absolute emotion, rests upon them"
(Ibid., 406), Lyall writes. This means that love, by itself has an 
intrinsic value.
Through love, in Lyall's account, we are capable of rising 
above the limitations of immediate objects as such and see them as 
participating in Being. What does this mean? Armour and Trott 
explain:
we have then a link between thought and feeling.
For only what is wholly unlimited can justify, 
finally, absolute allegiance, suppose x loves Y.
If X really does so, he does so unconditionally 
and without reservation. But, as he reflects on 
his situation, the limitations of Y must, in the 
end, become clear to him. As limitations, they 
suggest that they are occasions on which he 
should not give his unconditional allegiance to
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Y, but this conflicts with his love. In the end, 
he can only justify the combination of the two 
kinds of awareness if there is an ultimate being 
which is inherently valucible and without 
limitation in itself and within which there is a 
special and unique place to be occupied by Y. In 
that case, the limitations of Y are simply part 
of what makes it possible for Y to occupy that 
place in being. But that is only comprehensible 
in the case that being itself does measure up to 
the conditions. (Ibid., 80)
Therefore, that which gives rise to love does not have much to do 
with particular beings but with Being itself. By realizing that we 
love something which is worthy of absolute value we establish a 
connection between our emotional side and our intellectual side.
By claiming that "love is the necessary condition of a perfect 
moral nature" (Ibid., 405), Lyall connects the realm of emotions and 
the realm of morality. Our awareness of love is an incentive for us 
to respond to our moral emotions. But this awareness is an act of the 
intellect. By itself the intellect would not be able to reach Being 
and it does not have the power to interact with the world. Through 
the emotion of love we have the possibility of conceiving that Being 
is intrinsically valuable and, in a more general way, through our 
emotions we are able to bridge the gap between the intellect and the 
world.
For Lyall, a human being who lacks the capacity of having 
emotions is not fully human. "The 'Stoic of the woods - the man 
without a tear', - 'impassive, fearing but the shame of fear' was yet 
capable of the strongest emotion - was roused to indignation - was 
fired with revenge - was touched with tenderness - was moved to 
sympathy - though he could conceal all under an appearance of 
indifference, or restrain all within the bounds of comparative
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equanimity" (Ibid., 282). Being able to experience emotions is part 
of oneself and being conscious is another part. One cannot exist 
without the other. One's "mind warms under the sun that enlightens, 
kindles with emotion, and bursts into all the fruitfulness of moral 
and spiritual vegetation" (Ibid., 283).
Now, what is the link between intellect and emotion? The 
answer, Lyall thinks, lies in that faculty of mind that he calls 
Imagination. Lyall's chapter on imagination is the last one in the 
first part of Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature and it 
connects it with the second part, the one on emotions. Thus, in order 
to understand how it is that the intellect and the emotions are in 
close connection and how they interact, we have to understand what 
imagination is, because this faculty of mind, in Lyall's view is the 
meeting place of that which links us, as human beings who possess 
both the capacity to think and feel, with the phenomenal world and 
makes it possible for us to understand it. Following a Cartesian 
account, Lyall seems to believe that the intellect has knowledge of 
itself and through the emotions, has knowledge of the world, is 
connected with it, but only in imagination can it perceive of the 
human being as a whole in the world. We will insist on this issue in 
the next chapter.
But in the meantime, let us see what imagination is and how it 
works. Lyall talks about imagination after all other faculties of the 
mind have been looked at: conception, abstraction, judgment and 
reasoning. They all are faculties of the mind but, unlike 
imagination, they lack the peculiar state of mind which is the 
Imaginative state. The ideas of the mind, where imagination is 
concerned, "are seen under or accompanied by a state, which gives to
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them all their peculiarity; so that we have not merely ideas, but 
ideas of the imagination" (Ibid., 270).
Imagination is capable of bringing us into an emotional state 
because it filters reality in the sense that it makes us resonate 
with the phenomenal world. Through emotions we become attuned to 
aspects of reality which cannot be expressed using just the means 
offered by ordinary language. This is where imagination and 
metaphoric language come into play. Thus, due to our imaginative
capacity, we are able to make sense out of verses like the ones
Shakespeare wrote: "...come, seeling [sic] night,/Scarf up the tender 
eye of pitiful day" (cited by Lyall, idem, 272). The eye is tender, 
the day pitiful and the night comes sealing them.
These words which provoke our imagination cast a different 
light on the real, on what is. By putting together words like eye and 
tender, day and pitiful or sealing and night, one awakens certain
emotions in oneself. Lyall asks how this happens, when he writes:
Whence the power of these conceptions? or what 
gives them to us? It is the analogy that is 
couched in them? But every imaginative conception 
does not convey or embody analogy. And even where
it is analogy - as this unquestionably is the
principal source or vehicle of imaginative 
conception - that is the explanation of the 
beauty of any thought, the question is, why 
analogy should be such a source of beauty or 
produce such effects? What is there in analogy to
do this, and only in some analogies and not in
all? Many analogies are scientific, and have no 
imaginative character. It is not the analogy that 
will explain the imagination, neither is it 
imagination that gives a character to the 
analogy, but a certain state which we call the 
imaginative state, and which seems to be 
inexplicable, allows of certain analogies being 
imaginative, while others are not. (Ibid., 273)
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Lyall's conclusion is that it is not the analogy that explains 
imagination but rather that imaginative state which, in itself, 
defies definition. The reason why it defies explanation is that it is 
partly intellectual and partly emotional.
My opinion is that, inasmuch as it is intellectual, imagination 
implies seizing analogies or putting together disparate terms under 
one name. In as much as it is emotional, imagination connects us with 
Being, with "what is". The intellectual part provides us with a 
theoretical frame, with a matrix, separate from reality which is 
filled up with the "flesh" of Being through the emotional part. As 
Lyall puts it in his own more careful language: "It is in the 
imaginative state that the mind is so active in perceiving analogies, 
'seeking concretes', animating and personifying nature, and obtaining 
those figures of speech which have their element, or find their 
material, in resemblances and analogy" (Ibid., 274). This bit of text 
is one of the most important in Lyall's work on the link between the 
intellect, the emotions and imagination. It is true, it is located 
toward the end of his discussion of imagination but it is the peak 
whose versants are constituted by the intellect and the emotions. In 
the imaginative state, we discover the mind being active and 
perceiving analogies. In the imaginative state we find that Nature 
appears as animated, emotional. In this state, we are under the spell 
of the emotions. This seems like magic.
Now we must engage ourselves in the act of interpreting this 
text, amd look for what each important concept means, how are they 
connected, how Lyall sees them intertwined. Most importantly, we must 
see how they will appear after employing the tools offered by a
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phenomenology of emotions complemented with a hermeneutical approach 
to metaphor.
The bridge between the intellectual and the emotional is, as 
we saw before, the imagination whose most important characteristic is 
the imaginative state. Being able to imagine, to put ourselves in 
that imaginative state is what defines us as human beings, as both 
emotional and intellectual beings. The mind seeking "new concretes" 
when perceiving analogies brings to mind what Aristotle said, that 
"to be at inventing metaphors is to have an eye for resemblances" 
(Ricoeur 1976, 54).
The seeing of similarities, or analogies, as Lyall terms them, 
is the activity of the mind which, at its peak, creates metaphors. 
Thus, the active mind, in an imaginative state, which perceives 
analogies and personifies Nature, expressing it in a figure of 
speech is in fact the mind involved in the act of creating metaphors.
Moreover, in the imaginative state, personified and animated 
Nature is connected to us through our emotions. Thus, we have the 
metaphor which is a creation of our intellect and thus separated from 
the phenomenal reality but through emotion we are able to understand 
it "as if" it refers to something real.
Now that we have arrived at this point, I want to take this 
finding and introduce it into a new territory, whose coordinates are 
metaphor and emotion, this time though, viewed as they are regarded 
in modern philosophy. More specifically, by using Jean-Paul Sartre's 
existential analysis of emotions and Paul Ricoeur's theory of 
metaphor. I will make emotion and metaphor the foci of the next two 
chapters.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
XI. ON EMOTION
An emotion refers back to what it signifies. 
And, in effect, what it signifies is the 
totality of the relationships of the human 
reality to the world. The passage to emotion 
is a total modification of 'being-in-the- 
world' according to the very particular laws 
of magic.
J. P. Sartre
In this chapter I will inquire into how it is possible for the 
emotions to connect us with the phenomenal world and in doing so, I 
will explore the connection between imagination and emotion, all 
this, with the intention to develop Lyall's claim about the cognitive 
value of emotions. For Lyall the imaginative state has two parts, an 
intellectual one and an emotional one, and the emotional element is 
what connects us with reality. How does this work? How do our 
emotions link us to reality? And what kind of reality is that? In 
order to answer these questions I look for help in J.P. Sartre's 
theory of emotion.
For Sartre, emotion is a conscious transformation of the 
world, a "magical" world that is. I believe that Lyall, if offered 
the gift of phenomenology, would reach very similar conclusions to 
those of Sartre or, to put it in a different way, Lyall seems to 
anticipate Sartre by putting his analysis of emotions in a framework
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which is not at all coinmon to his time. However, Sartre's approach 
offers just a fictitious connection with the world because he was 
only able to see emotions "as fictive idealism", as Joseph Fell puts 
it in his book on the Emotion in the Thought of Sartre (1966, 236) . 
Now, Lyall's assertion that emotions connect us with Being which, of 
course, should be understood as asserting emotion as an expression of 
God's existence. Thus, he avoids reaching Sartre's unhappy 
conclusion.
This chapter begins with a survey of four different theories 
which attempt to understand the complex phenomenon of emotion. We 
need to do this survey in order to discover a framework that will 
best suit Lyall's views. What follows is a discussion of Sartre's 
theory which I consider most successful and its applicsibility to 
Lyall's, stressing their striking similarities and their important 
difference.
FOUR THEORIES OF EMOTION
William Lyons, in his book on Emotion (1980), distinguishes 
among four classical theories of emotion: the feeling theory, the 
behaviorist theory, the psychoanalytic theory and the cognitive 
theory. While the feeling and the cognitive theories of emotions have 
been the most influential and important in philosophy, the 
behaviorist and the psychoanalytic theories were valued the most in 
psychology. In what follows I will give a short description of each.
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intending to emphasize their merits as well as their flaws. What I am 
looking for is a theory that connects emotion and imagination and 
involves the intellectual side as well and one that considers 
emotions able to create a link between the emotional person and the 
phenomenal world.
The Feeling Theory
The feeling theory is based on the Cartesian account of 
emotions, as it appears in The Fassions of the Soul. For Descartes, 
soul and body have different functions. The body's functions are 
movement and heat. All the movements of the limbs are explained by 
drawing on the movements of the animal spirits which are extremely 
small material bodies and "the most animated and subtle portions of 
the blood" (Descartes 1985-1991, 335). The soul's function is thought 
and it is of two sorts: actions or desires which either aim at 
something immaterial, for example God, or at moving our body; and 
passions which represent our reflective awareness of the disturbances 
occurring in the body. "Fear, for example, is the awareness of the 
animal spirits causing or tending to cause us, say, to turn our back 
and run away, and is caused by these animal spirits. That is why, for 
Descartes, emotions are passive or passions" (Lyons 1980, 4).
This explanation of emotion as passion implies that in 
experiencing an emotion we are merely aware of what our soul feels 
when there is something going on in the body. But the connection
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between emotion and behavior thus described has a major flaw, pointed
out by Lyons :
Perhaps the most fundamental difficulty with 
Descartes' view of emotions is that it does not 
separate off what are commonly agreed to be 
emotions from what are commonly agreed not to be 
emotions. Given his theory, Descartes is forced 
to grant not merely that the subjective awareness 
of the bodily movements and physiological changes 
following on a perception of something such as a 
frightening animal, is an emotion, but also that 
the subjective awareness of the bodily movements 
and physiological changes following the injection 
of a drug or the onset of a disease, should merit 
the title 'emotion'. For after all the perception 
of the external object is not central to 
Descartes' account of emotion, for he does allow 
that some emotions, such as objectless and 
imaginary-object fears are caused entirely by 
'temperaments of the body or [„.] impressions 
which are fortuitously met with in the 
brain'(1985 - 1991, 356), and there is no rubric 
laid down as to how these in turn must be caused.
So it seems that there is nothing against a 
disease or drug causing them. (Ibid., 7-8)
William James tried to straighten out Descartes' account of emotion 
by considering that, even though emotions are feelings, they are 
feelings "of the physiological changes and disturbances that went on 
during an emotional occurrence". According to Lyons, "[James'] hope 
was that, at least eventually, psychology would be able to 
distinguish emotions from one another, and from non-emotions, by 
reference to these observable changes" (Ibid., 12).
For William James, it is impossible to imagine an emotion 
occurring without physiological change. The emotion is our awareness 
or feeling of the bodily changes which themselves are ignited by the 
perception of the object of the emotion. This way, the only link 
between emotion and consciousness is the perception of the object.
But it too acts only as a "causal antecedent to emotion". The idea of
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an emotion dissociated from our feeling of the body is non-sense 
because then there is nothing left to it, James considers. If there 
is no increase in our heart beat making our blood rush madly through 
our veins, if our muscles do not contract and our hands do not become 
clenched into a fist, then how can we know that we are experiencing 
the emotion of rage? Feeling all these changes is what constitutes an 
emotion.
To sum it all up, even though James writes from a Cartesian 
perspective, "he took the feeling out of the soul and put it into a 
purely bodily arena, for his feeling was just the subjective side of 
the physiological changes involved, so that if the feeling was 
different for each emotion it was because the physiological changes 
accompanying each emotion must be different as well" (Ibid., 15).
This distinction opens up the way to objective quantitative 
measurement in which the modern psychology of emotions is rooted.
Once it had a specific given with which it could work, which could be 
used in experiments, psychology detached itself from philosophy and 
became a separate discipline. However, this approach to emotions, 
besides being too wide and inclusive, does not allow for any • 
cognitive element to enter the discussion, save for the "perception 
of the object" which only acts as a "causal antecedent to emotion".
The Behaviorlst Theory
Behaviorism, roughly defined, is the theory or doctrine that 
human or animal psychology can be accurately studied only through the
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examination and analysis of objectively observable and quantifiable 
behavioral events, in contrast with subjective mental states. Two of 
the most influential exponents of the behaviorist theory are J.B. 
Watson who is usually considered to be the "father" of behaviorist 
psychology, and B.F. Skinner, a m o d e m  representative. William Lyons 
observes that: "The behaviorist theory of emotions, like behaviorism 
itself, is a product of that period when psychology was breaking away 
from philosophy and seeking to establish itself as a natural science" 
(Ibid., 17) .
Watson considered emotions to be part of the behavior patterns 
which are somehow inherited and not so much acquired. New-born 
children have these patterns unaltered and, thus, the place to look 
for "pure" emotions is in infants. "An emotion is an hereditary 
'pattern-reaction' involving profound changes of the bodily mechanism 
as a whole, but particularly of the visceral and glandular systems.
By pattern reaction we mean that the separate details of response 
appear with some constancy, with some regularity and in approximately 
the same sequential order each time the exciting stimulus is 
presented" (Watson 1919, 195). The emotion occurs when everything 
that concerns the stimulus and the mechanism of physiological 
response is just right so the effect produced by the stimulus is the 
intended one. But following this account we have to favor some 
stimuli over others and also we have to be able to explain why the
same stimulus causes different emotional reactions in different
subjects. For example, the sight and the closeness of a big dog might
frighten a little child but the same big dog might be the pride of
his owner. How can these different emotions be explained in these 
circumstances ?
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One way to explain emotional difference is by declaring that 
hereditary patterns change with one's psychological development. 
Acquired characteristics come onto the scene and they distort the 
hereditary ones. In fact, there cannot be a line drawn between what 
is inherited and what is not, between hereditary patterns and 
acquired features. This means that a very clear account of what it 
is to have an emotion is not really possible. For similar reasons it 
is not really possible to distinguish clearly among emotions. Even 
though Watson distinguished emotions which occur when "the 
adjustments called out by the stimulus are internal and confined to 
the subject's body", for example blushing, from instinctive reactions 
which happen when "the stimulus leads to adjustment of the organism 
as a whole to objects", for example, in defensive responses, 
grasping, etc., his argument is not strong enough.
Watson affirms that the hereditary pattern is thus shattered 
apart and it largely disappears. Lyons' assessment is that when this 
occurs we are left with very little to circumscribe the definition of 
emotion :
Watson has told us that an emotion is a 'pattern- 
reaction' , chiefly of physiological changes, 
which is found in its unadulterated form only in 
the new-born child, though it is difficult to get 
clear evidence of this. Since he admits that this 
'pattern-reaction' is adulterated or becomes 
etiolated, or both, soon after infancy, he is 
admitting in effect that with adults one cannot 
distinguish one emotion from another, or 
emotional reactions from other sorts of reaction, 
by means of a behaviorist account. Indeed, given 
the admitted paucity of his evidence concerning 
emotional reactions in the new-born, one can 
doubt his claim to be able to do this even with 
infants. (Ibid., 18)
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Thus Watson's behavioral explanation of emotions is circular. He 
affirms that pure emotions are only experienced by new-born children 
and that emotional reactions alter soon after infancy to the extent 
that adults are no longer able to discern among different emotions. 
However, he brings little evidence in support of the idea that 
"pattem-reactions" in new-born children are pristine and therefore 
he fails to explain how they become altered with the passing of time. 
Watson's view is taken further and somehow improved by B.F. Skinner. 
Unlike Watson, Skinner does not stress the physiological changes nor 
the reflex behavior. Instead, he emphasizes the operant behavior 
which is that behavior whose outcome is the desired one.
What does it mean for Skinner to say the desired result is 
brought about by operant behavior? Suppose, for example, that X 
offends Y. As a result, X gets angry, clenches his fists, pounds the 
table, slams the door, etc. This kind of behavior will drive Y out of 
the way and thus, Y's offensive behavior, which started the scene 
will not be persisted in nor, probably, repeated. X was predisposed 
to emit this specific operant behavior (pounding the table and 
slamming the door) and the offensive behavior of Y was the promoter 
of it. But nothing guarantees that the above behavior is always 
exhibited by everyone. X might react in the way described above or 
might just calmly walk away and breath deeply, pretending there was 
no harm done. Moreover, it would be an impossible task to list all 
features of a specific behavior (angry) that must be present for that 
behavior to be considered as angry. William Lyons argues that:
Skinner's behaviorism, much more than Watson's 
version, is open to the difficulty that many 
instances of some emotions, and most instances of 
the others, exhibit little or no operant 
behavior. Grief, especially when it is about
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something irretrievably lost or dead, does not 
lead to much, if any, operant behavior, because 
no behavior can bring about any desired results. 
For the desired result - that what is dead be 
brought back to life or what is irretrievably 
lost be found - is clearly impossible to 
achieve. But even angry people can be angry and 
not show it in operant behavior. That is, some 
people are just controlled, undemonstrative 
people. (Ibid., 22)
Simply put, Skinner's account takes away any chance for freedom we 
might have because there is no possibility for us to behave in a way 
that we consciously choose. Instead we only exhibit an operant 
behavior.
In the introduction to Existential Psychoanalysis (a 
translation of a major section of Sartre's Being and Nothingness, 
about the connection between existentialism and psychoanalysis), 
Rollo May gives a brief account of the exchange between Carl Rogers 
and B.F. Skinner at a 1960 conference. Told from Rogers' viewpoint, 
the exchange between them is the following:
From what I understood Dr. Skinner to say, it is 
his understanding that though he might have 
thought he chose to come to this meeting, might 
have thought he had a purpose in giving his 
speech, such thoughts are really illusory. He 
actually made certain marks on paper and emitted 
certain sounds here simply because his genetic 
make-up and his past environment had operantly 
conditioned his behavior in such a way that it 
was rewarding to make these sounds, and that he 
as a person doesn't enter into this. In fact if I 
get his thinking correctly, from his strictly 
scientific point of view, he, as a person, 
doesn't exist'. In his reply Dr. Skinner said 
that he would not go into the question of whether 
he had any choice in the matter (presumably 
because the whole issue is illusory) but stated,
'I do accept your characterization of my own 
presence here'. I do not need to labor the point 
that for Dr. Skinner the concept of 'learning to 
be free' would be quite meaningless. (Sartre 
1966, 4)
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The kind of explanation of emotions offered by the behaviorist theory 
takes away any conscious interaction between us, as human beings and 
the surrounding world. Everything happens without us participating in 
it. We just react, we just perform in the presence of certain 
stimuli. Thus, besides being too narrow and exclusive, this theory 
has nothing to offer in the way of a cognitive aspect underlying our 
emotions.
The Psychoanalytic Theory
Another approach to the subject of emotions is offered by 
psychoanalysis. Of course, the inventor and chief exponent of this 
theory is Freud. Even though he did not have a specific and clear 
account of emotions: Freud called emotions "affects". However, 
because of Freud's main preoccupation with treating his emotionally 
disturbed patients, the only emotions that were considered were the 
negative emotions like fear, anxiety, etc. The emotions of this kind 
are resurrections of traumatic events which were repressed in the 
individual's unconscious. "Affective states", considers Freud in 
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1971), "have become 
incorporated in the mind as precipitates of primaeval traumatic 
experiences, and when a similar situation occurs they are revived 
like mnemic symbols" (1971, 93) . For Freud, an emotion has more to do 
with the individual's inherited repressed memories which themselves
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are 'stored' in the unconscious. This way, an emotion occurs not 
primarily because there is an external cause for it but rather 
because it is connected with an originally traumatic and subsequently 
repressed memory. Lyons explains that:
Unlike the Cartesian, or the Behaviorist accounts 
for that matter, the Freudian account sees the 
external stimulus as acting only as remote cause 
of emotion. Events in the world cause us to react 
emotionally only insofar as they first stir up in 
us some instinctual drive or impulse, and insofar 
as this drive or impulse is repressed or blocked.
Emotion is the safety valve that lets off psychic 
steam when the repression or blocking of the 
normal outlets becomes unbearable." (Lyons 1980,
29)
This implies that emotion is not primarily a reaction to the world 
but to something that is in our unconscious. ".In anxiety", Lyons 
writes, "I am anxious, not because the situation is difficult or 
threatening, but because it triggers off some unconscious repressed 
desire which I find threatening or difficult to cope with" (Ibid., 
29). But this sort of explanation would raise immediately some 
questions because there can be a great number of possible 
manifestations of anxiety, and choosing the one that fits best is a 
pretty difficult job.
William Lyons believes that J. P. Sartre proposes quite an 
interesting variation on the Freudian account of emotion. Sartre's 
account substitutes Freud's concept of unconscious with the concept 
of "magical" behavior But the idea that emotion's significance does 
not consist in "ordinary perceptual consciousness" is still at work 
(Ibid., 28). Sartre's rejection of the unconscious is based on the 
fact that he observes that consciousness must always be aware of
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itself. This awareness, however is not constantly made explicit in 
reflection; Sartre calls it a pre-reflective consciousness which does 
not take the self as an object. The two theories analyzed above - the 
feeling theory and the behaviorist theory failed to look at the body 
as a subject. Only treating it as an object, they failed as well at 
giving a pertinent account of emotions.
For Sartre, thoughts, dreams and feelings depend on 
consciousness, and consciousness is where one should look for 
explanations for them. Mental events are intentional events; they are 
always meaningful and they are always directed towards objects of 
their own. Thus, Sartre moves a long way away from Freud's 
perspective: "The Freudians are held to be wrong because they 
overlook the intentionality of mental events, and think that there 
can be an inductively determined causal relation between my dream, 
let us say, and some external object—a relation of which I, the 
patient, am not aware since the connection is made by me 
subconsciously. So the argument against bare causal explanations of 
mental phenomena and against the unconscious come to the same"
(Sartre 1976, 9) . Sartre sees emotion not as an accident, but. as a 
"mode of our conscious existence, one of the ways in which 
consciousness understands (in Heidegger's sense of Verstehen) its 
Being-in-the-World" (Ibid., 91). This, I think, brings him closer to 
a cognitive theory of emotion, which will be discussed next.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
The Cognitive Theory
As regards the cognitive theory of emotion, Aristotle seems to 
be the first who took this approach among philosophers. However, he 
did not analyze it in De Anima as one would expect, but rather in the 
Rhetoric. In his book on Aristotle's concept of emotion, W. W. 
Fortenbaugh notes that:
In the second book of the Rhetoric, Aristotle 
defines anger as a desire for revenge accompanied 
by pain on account of (dia) an apparent slight to 
oneself or to one's own, the slight being 
unjustified (1378 a 30-2) [...] Anger is not pain 
which happens to occur together with (meta) the 
thought of outrage. On the contrary, anger is 
necessarily caused by the thought of outrage, so 
that such a thought is mentioned in the essential 
definition of anger. The same is true of fear. It 
is caused by the thought of imminent danger, so 
that the appearance of future evil, destructive 
or painful, is mentioned in the definition of 
fear (1382 a 21-2). Fear is not some pain or 
bodily disturbance distinct from cognition. It is 
a complex phenomenon which necessarily involves 
not only painful disturbance but also the thought 
of danger. (1975, 12)
Lyons stresses the fact that this last theory is most likely closer 
to a comprehensive explanation of emotion because it explains what 
the theories previously analyzed did not. A person experiencing an 
emotion, in Aristotle's view, has a certain perception of the world. 
One thinks in a certain way about the people one is angry with and
one thinks that way because of a certain reason. However, just this
is not enough to make up an emotion. Besides the particular
perception of the world one has feelings and impulses which are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
54
triggered by what one thinks about the world. This means that the 
primary cause for physiological changes is constituted by one's 
belief. Believing that something is going to affect our physical 
integrity, for example, causes us to experience fear.
The cognitive theory stresses the importance of the fact that 
emotion is not something that rests just on feeling, or just on 
behavior, or is just a reaction to a traumatic event. Au contraire, 
there is an intellectual part to it also.
An emotion then is not something that has to do exclusively 
with the body or exclusively with the mind but rather it has to do 
with both of them. This happens because through emotions one becomes 
part of the world. Through emotions it is the body and the mind, 
intertwined, that participate to the world. It's not just a reaction 
toward an external stimulus and it is not a reaction to a suppressed 
trauma. Rather, it has to do with belief in a specific appreciation 
of the world.
FROM LZALL TO SARTRE AND BACK
How does William Lyall relate to the foregoing accounts of 
emotion? Under which heading should his theory of- emotion be 
classified? Lyall's ideas about emotions seem to come very close to 
the cognitive view. He too believed that emotions tell us something 
about the fcibric of the world. However, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, Lyall has idealist tendencies. This implies that for him the
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world itself has been "poured" into a specific frame. Being so very- 
close to the spirit of Romanticism, we can understand how he relates 
to nature within the idealist framework. It is an underlying theme of 
this period of time that, once the subject and the object, mind and 
nature have been separated, once an unbridgeable gap has been placed 
between them, one concludes that the only way the subject can know 
itself is through what it does to the object, and the only way the 
object can be known is through what it does to the subject. What can 
we talk about, then? The interaction between the two, the 
interpretational tension between mind and world. Neither the self, 
nor the world can be known, that is, talked about; they can only be 
experienced, the one in terms of the other. Reality, then, is what 
the mind has done to the world and what the world has done to the 
mind. Spirit is the term many Romantics used for interpreting the 
tension between the subject and the object or reality.
Lyall seems to regard the interaction between the subject and 
the object as a challenge and his account of emotions can be taken as 
his answer. Unlike Berkeley's idealism, for example, or Hegel's,
Lyall builds his case by considering that the link between the world 
and the self is facilitated by the emotions. Moreover, for Lyall, 
imagination is of foremost importance when it comes to explaining the 
link between the world and the self. In the imaginative state, both 
emotions and the intellect meet. Emotions, in Lyall's view, reach out 
for reality and through them, the intellect grasps its essence. But 
this can not happen if we lack imagination. Imagination is both 
intellectual and emotional.
Now, from the foregoing theories of emotions, the one that 
comes very close to Lyall's particular view is the one developed by
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J. P. Sartre. Sartre links consciousness and emotions and wraps them 
up in the veil of a "magical behavior". Being able to use our 
imagination is what brings us into the presence of the world as our 
emotions discover it.
£»artre: Imagination and Emotions
With regard to this issue, Sartre asks "what must be the 
nature of consciousness in general in order that the construction of 
an image should always be possible?" (1966, 259). In imagination, 
thought does not reach out for the object, but rather "appears as the 
object". Sartre tells us what it means:
If the development of an idea occurs in the form 
of a series of imaginative consciousnesses that 
are synthetically linked, it will imbue the 
object as an image with a sort of vitality. It 
will appear now under one aspect, now under 
another, now with this determination, now with 
some other. To judge that a coachman whose face 
one imagines vaguely had a mustache is to see his 
face appear as having a mustache. There is an 
imaginative form of the judgment which is nothing 
else than the addition to the object of new 
qualities, accompanied by the feeling of 
venturing, promising, or of assuming 
responsibilities [...] If we think imaginatively of 
some individual objects it will be these objects 
themselves that will appear to our consciousness.
(Ibid., 160)
Thus, for Sartre, the images acquire the right to existence ."as any 
other existence". The only difference between the type of existence 
given to us in imagination and the real existence is the way in which
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we grasp them. While the real existence is perceived as forming a 
whole, where "my attention is co-present as an essential condition of 
the existence of the reality actually perceived" (Ibid., 262), we 
grasp the existence given to us in imagination by isolating it from 
the perceived reality and by positing it as empty of data. "To posit 
an image is to construct an object on the fringe of the whole of 
reality, which means therefore to hold the real at a distance, to 
free oneself from it, in a word, to deny it" (Ibid., 266). 
Consciousness cannot exist without imagining because this ability is 
consciousness' ticket for freedom. "In order to imagine, 
consciousness must be free from all specific reality and this freedom 
must be able to define itself by a 'being-in-the-world which is at 
once the constitution and the negation of the world" (Ibid., 269- 
270). Imagination is where consciousness realizes its own freedom by 
withdrawing from the real, by always being able, at any moment, to 
produce the unreal. This is how consciousness works when imagining.
Now, with regard to emotions, Sartre affirms that emotional 
consciousness is not reflective consciousness. An emotion does not 
present itself as a state of mind of which the one experiencing the 
emotion is conscious. This would be equivalent to saying that the 
perception of this paper is consciousness of perceiving the paper.
The emotional consciousness is "primarily consciousness of the 
world". "In a word, the emotional subject and the object of the 
emotion are united in an indissoluble synthesis. The emotion is a 
specific manner of apprehending the world" (Sartre 1976, 57). The 
world is continuously present to the emotional subject. There is an 
interconnection which avoids the reflectivity of consciousness. For 
Sartre, emotion is "a transformation of the world". Now, the world
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itself is regarded under two different aspects: the world is either 
"instrumental" or "difficult".
There is, first, an instrumental perspective on the world. 
Joseph Fell explains that in Sartre's view, "Men perceive their 
environment as a complex of instruments, a medium in which, provided 
we know certain rules or techniques, we can manipulate people and 
things so as to achieve certain ends... We assume this regularity every 
time we act" (Fell 1966, 15). As long as things happen following the 
same structure, as long as they are out-there, they are, at the same 
time, in one's ambiance, to use a term employed by Gabriel Marcel in 
his metaphysical journal. We are, more or less, comfortable with what 
goes on around us. We do things in a certain way because we know what 
to expect; we know what sort of reactions a certain action would 
cause as long as the world unfolds in the way we are used to it. This 
does not mean, however, that we merely follow habits. Sartre would 
react virulently against this idea. Orestes, the chief character in 
Sartre's play. The Flies, would be the most representative character 
with regard to this. He shouted against a manipulating and dilettante 
Zeus, as Sartre doubtless would do, "I am my freedom*". What Sartre 
means by this kind of declaration is that the world, in its 
instrumental pragmatic feature is an easy world. This world seems to 
be deterministic because it follows our expectations and we are not 
deceived by it, as Sartre explains :
From this point of view, the world around us - 
that which the Germans call the Umwelt - the 
world of our desires, our needs and of our 
activities, appears to be all furrowed with 
strait and narrow paths leading to such and such 
determinate ends - that is, it has the appearance 
of a created object. Naturally, here and there, 
and to some extent everywhere, there are pitfalls 
and trap s...This world is difficult. The notion of
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difficulty here is not a reflexive notion which 
would imply a relation to oneself. It is out 
there, in the world, it is a quality of the world 
given to perception (just as the paths to the 
possible goals, the possibilities themselves and 
the exigencies of objects - books that ought to 
be read, shoes to be resoled, etc.), it is the 
noetic correlate of the activity we have 
undertaken - or have only conceived. (Ibid., 63)
Therefore, the world is double-faced. There is an easy world, on the 
one hand, and there is a difficult world, on the other hand. This 
difficult world, however, is also the world in which we live and in 
which we must act. Sometimes it becomes unbearable but we still need 
to act, to continue living even though the things of the world do not 
follow their expected paths, even though they happen as if they are 
out of control.
For Sartre though, we are our freedom which implies that the 
world is "out of control", if the "time is out of joint", as 
Shakespeare said through Hamlet's voice, we cannot afford to remain 
immobilized and prostrate waiting for it to change and become 
Instrumental again. Rather, we change the world itself by making it a 
magical world. What this means in Sartre's view is explained at least 
in part by Fell:
Emotion is a way of acting on ourselves when 
action in the pragmatic world is of no avail. The 
'magic' consists in the fact that our action on 
ourselves (e.g., fainting) is intended as a 
transformation of the world, not of ourselves. We 
have remarked that in emotion attention is 
directed outward, on the object. To be sure, were 
the subject later to reflect upon his action he 
would recognize his failure to transform the 
world. Magic is not efficacious. But Sartre 
repeatedly emphasizes that emotional behavior is 
unreflective. And in the unreflective state the
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sub]ect 'lives' the magical transformation: it is 
the world which seems changed.(Fell 1966, 17)
There are two different ways in which consciousness can "be-in-the- 
world". There is, first, a perception of the world as a "complex of 
utilizable things" which are manipulated in order to obtain such and 
such results. "If one weuits to produce a predetermined effect, one 
must act upon the determinable elements of that complex" (Sartre 1976, 
90). Thus, acting, asserting one's freedom has a major significance. 
However, at this level, there is no absolute action, there is no 
possible way in which to act in order for a 'radical change' to 
occur. Rather, "we have to modify one particular utensil, and this by 
means of another which refers in its turn to yet another, and so to 
infinity" (Ibid., 90).
Besides the instrumentalist way of being-in-the-world, there 
is another one, where the world does not present itself as an 
utilizable whole any longer. Acting, now is set on a different 
perspective. This time, there is nothing at hand that can be used in 
order to change it, there is no intermediary between us and the 
world. The world loses its structure and its categories, Sartre 
explains when, for example, we are frightened by someone seen through 
a window:
the face that frightens us through the window 
acts upon us without any means; there is no need 
for the window to open, for a man to leap into 
the room or to walk across the floor) . And, 
conversely, the consciousness tries to combat 
these dangers or to modify these objects at no 
distance and without means, by some absolute, 
massive modification of the world. This aspect of 
the world is an entirely coherent one; this is 
the magical world. (Ibid., 90)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
61
This is the kind of magic that occurs when we experience an emotion. 
On Sartre's view, emotion is not comprehended any longer as something 
that comes from outside. Rather, it is something that begins with 
consciousness, where consciousness returns to the magical attitude 
which is characteristic of a magical world. "Clearly to understand 
the emotional process as it proceeds from consciousness, we must 
remember the dual nature of the body, which, on the one hand is an 
object in the world and on the other is immediately lived by the 
consciousness" (Ibid., 77), writes Sartre. Thus, emotional 
consciousness does more than merely "projecting affective meanings 
upon the world around it", because the body is not just an 
instrument.
The Magical World
The human body, in Sartre's account is also something through 
which consciousness lives the world. If the world happens to be a new 
world, a magical world into which consciousness leaps when 
experiencing an emotion then, the body is also there. It is affected, 
it undergoes changes. The body, "considered as the point of view upon 
the universe immediately inherent in consciousness" alters itself in 
order to meet the behavioral manifestations. Sartre believes that :
the origin of emotion is a spontaneous debasement 
lived by consciousness in face of the world. What 
it is unable to endure in one way it tries to 
seize in another way, by going to sleep, by 
reducing itself to the states of consciousness in 
sleep, dream or hysteria. And the bodily 
disturbance is nothing else than the belief lived
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by the consciousness, as it is seen from 
outside.(Ibid., 79)
However, the magic of the world is not only a temporary quality which 
is projected upon the world according to our particular emotional 
state.
The emotional world often presents itself to us as being
magical, as breaking free from any structure and thus it provokes us
to change in the following ways highlighted by Sartre:
Thus, there are two forms of emotion, according
to whether it is we who constitute the magic of
the world to replace a deterministic activity 
which cannot be realized, or whether the world 
itself is unrealizable and reveals itself 
suddenly as a magical environment. In the state 
of horror, we are suddenly made aware that the 
deterministic barriers have given way. That face 
which appears at the window, for instance - we do 
not at first take it as that of a man, who might 
push the door open and take twenty paces to where 
we are standing. On the contrary, it presents 
itself, motionless though it is, as acting at a 
distance. The face outside the window is in 
immediate relationship with our body; we are 
living and undergoing its signification; it is 
with our own flesh that we constitute it, but at 
the same time it imposes itself, annihilates the 
distance and enters into us. Consciousness 
plunged into this magic world drags the body with 
it in as much as the body is belief and the 
consciousness believes in it. (Ibid., 86-87)
But the "magic" quality of the world does not pertain exclusively to 
the human. "It extends to things also, in as much as they may present 
themselves as human (the disturbing impression of a landscape, of 
certain objects, or a room which retains the traces of some 
mysterious visitor) or bear the inç>rint of the psychic" (Ibid., 87). 
This happens, Sartre thinks, because consciousness grasps the world 
as having magical features and because it can perceive these magical
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features as real features. It is not just one object or another, 
taken away from the surrounding world, that can be perceived as say, 
frightening or irritating.
According to Sartre, when someone experiences an emotion, the 
whole world is changed. The whole world transforms its structure, is 
altered, on Fell's account of his theory, in the following way:
We may say that in emotion consciousness 
perceives a world transformed by its affective 
projections. This 'new' world is a 'magical' one 
for two reasons. First, in it the orderly and 
regular paths which permit the achievement of 
ends by determinate means are obliterated by a 
spellbinding quality ( 'horrible', 'revolting', 
etc.). Second, consciousness falls under this 
spell and is deceived by its own sleight of hand.
It is significant that Sartre refers to emotion 
as a 'degradation' of consciousness. In emotion, 
'consciousness is caught in its own trap'.
Sartre's catalog of emotions is a catalog of 
self-deceptions [...] Furthermore, for Sartre, 
emotional deceptions seem predominantly of a 
negative - even dire - sort: fear, sadness, 
horror, anger, disgust, and the like.(Fell 1966,
22-23)
Sartre follows the phenomenological tradition and praises Husserl for 
turning to the "things in themselves". "To Heidegger, to Sartre, to 
Merleau-Ponty, Husserl is something of a savior: the philosopher who 
finally has assembled the proper conceptual apparatus...for rejoining 
subject and world, value and fact, in a long-lost Immédiats relation. 
Sartre's theory of emotion is one phase of this attempt" (Ibid.,
226) . For Sartre objects are originally charged with an affective 
meaning. "All this comes to pass as if we come to life in a universe 
where feelings and acts are all charged with something material, have 
a substantial stuff, are really soft, dull, slimy, low, elevated, 
etc. and in which material substances have originally a psychic
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meaning which renders them repugnant, horrifying, alluring, etc." 
(1956, 605). For Sartre, the meaningfulness of a "thing" is the 
result of a fusion between one's project to appropriate it and the 
thing's disobedience to appropriation. There is a constant interplay 
between the pour-soi and the en-soi.
But Sartre's conception of the interplay of consciousness and 
Being whenever one experiences an emotion is a conscious self- 
deception. The world is a magical world, and thus the relation 
between it and consciousness is a fictitious relation, as Fell 
explains :
[Sartre] tells us that there is an intermonde 
between pour-soi and en-soi but that it is a 
fiction. The intermonde is the relation I try to 
establish, the relation which the object resists.
There is thus a 'midworld' relating pour-soi and 
en-soi, but the relation is one of denial of 
relation, of antithesis. Here, as always in 
Sartre's position, antithesis prevails; there can 
be no synthesis, no continuum. Relations are 
always fictions. If all relations are attempted 
appropriations, and if appropriation is a 
fiction, then all relations are fictive. This 
really amounts to saying (a) there is 
'projection' but it is not unreflectively 
recognized as such; (b) the 'projected meaning' 
is abrogated by the recalcitrant object whose own 
'meaning' (or ultimate ontological significance) 
is its resistance to 'projective meaning'; (c) 
therefore recognition of the real nature of 
affective intentionality involves a divorce of 
the intentional value from its object, an 
abrogation of 'naive contact with the world', an 
affirmation of the fundamental ontological 
disparity between subject and object. (Fell 1966,
228)
This disparity between subject and object reigned in the history of 
philosophy since Descartes' split between mind and matter. What 
Sartre does is to build a bridge between res cogitans (the thinking 
mind) and res ex ten sa (the extended body) fashioned by the new and
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appealing phenomenological perspective which recognizes bodily 
subj ectivity.
However, there is something peculiar in the way Descartes had 
been understood: his ideas developed in different ways in German 
philosophy and in French philosophy. Descartes, without the proof of 
God's existence can be regarded as an idealist. This, as Anthony 
Beavers explains, is how the Germans saw him:
Kant labels him a 'problematic idealist' for whom 
'there is only one empirical assertion that is 
indubitably certain, namely that I am' {Critique 
of Pure Reason B274), suggesting that, as far as 
Kant is concerned, Descartes' attempt to prove 
the real existence of anything outside of his 
mind, including God, does not work. And 
Schopenhauer, just before claiming that 'true 
philosophy must at all costs be idealistic, ' 
praises Descartes for finding the 'only correct 
starting point [...] of all philosophy' (World as 
Will and Representation II, 4). Husserl is so 
taken by this starting point that he will title 
one of his introductions to pure phenomenology,
Cartesian Meditations, thus inviting his reader 
to repeat Descartes’ Meditations, this time, 
without the proofs for God’s existence and divine 
veracity. Due to the tradition in which he has 
been passed down to us, Descartes may be called 
not only the 'father of modern philosophy,' but 
also 'the grandfather of transcendental 
phenomenology'. (Beavers 1990)
However, for Descartes, practical life has a particular importance 
and meditating on the principles of metaphysics will not bring about 
its significance.
According to Descartes, imagination and the senses are to be 
focused upon after establishing the existence of God and of the soul. 
In Descartes' words:
I think that it is very necessary to have 
understood, once in a lifetime, the principles of 
metaphysics since it is by them that we come to 
the knowledge of God and of our soul. But I think
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also that it would be very harmful to occupy 
one's intellect frequently in meditating upon 
them, since this would impede it from devoting 
itself to the imagination and the senses. (1970, 
143)
Thus, for Descartes the epistemologist the human being is composed of 
two separate entities the mind and the body. Epistemology needs this 
distinction because this is the only way it can work. But there is 
something more to human nature than this.
Besides the mind and the body there is another "primitive 
notion" as Descartes calls it and that is "the union of soul and 
body":
The soul can be conceived only by pure intellect: 
the body (i.e., extension, shape and movement) 
can likewise be known by pure intellect, but much 
better by the intellect aided by the imagination; 
and finally what belongs to the union of the soul 
and body can be known only obscurely by pure 
intellect or by the intellect aided by the 
imagination, but it can be known very clearly by 
the senses. That is why people who never 
philosophize and use only their senses have no 
doubt that the soul moves the body and the body 
acts on the soul. (Ibid., 141)
Here imagination and the senses are given their due and it would be 
unfair to Descartes to categorize him hastily as "the father of 
transcendental phenomenology". Descartes holds that mind and body are 
both divorced and in a union. But because the intellect can see 
clearly the distinction and only obscurely the union it does not 
constitute a concern.
Descartes' idea of this union of mind and body is not a clear 
cind distinct idea. But most certainly it is present in Descartes' 
philosophical letters and he makes use of it in his attempt to 
understand the way human beings exist in the world, in the practical
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world. A  person emerges in the world of everyday involvements as 
thought together with the body. Otherwise, the world would be merely 
a theoretical one which is an object of scientific investigations. I 
am fully aware of the ideas expressed by Descartes at the end of the 
second Meditation:
it is now manifest to me that even bodies are not 
properly speaking known by the senses or by the 
faculty of imagination, but by the understanding 
only, and since they are not known from the fact
that they are seen or touched, but only because
they are understood, I see clearly that there is
nothing which is easier for me to know than my 
mind. (1985-1991, 157)
I do not want to turn Descartes on his head. I just want to point out 
an idea that is meaningful and which has had a much greater influence 
later in the area of French phenomenology.
The idea of bodily subjectivity is something which will later 
become valuable in the hands of Merleau-Ponty, for example, and, to a
certain extent, this is how Descartes is perceived in the French
philosophical tradition. For Merleau-Ponty:
Being thought united with a body, it [the union] 
cannot, by definition, really be thought 
(conceived). One can practice it, and, so to 
speak, exist it; yet one can draw nothing from it 
which deserves to be called true ... The truth is 
that it is absurd to submit to pure 
understanding, the mixture of understanding and 
body. These would-be thoughts are the hallmarks 
of 'ordinary usage', mere verbalizations of this 
union, and can be allowed only if they are not 
taken to be thoughts. They are indices of an 
order of existence - of man and world as existing 
- about which we do not have to think. (1964,
176)
The Cartesian observation that once the mind is incarnate in the body 
and lived as a unity, it appears in the world of daily involvements.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
has not only been picked up by Merleau-Ponty. It also appears in the 
works of Sartre and Levinas, who recognize a bodily intentionality 
that is directed towards an other person who exists outside of the 
horizons of reason or beyond the cabinet of consciousness.
In all four cases - and here I am including Descartes - 
affectivity is an intimate characteristic of embodiment that enables 
the practical connections that make up daily life. Here we are again: 
affectivity' We get in touch with ourselves as bodies and minds (at 
the same time) and with the surrounding world through affectivity.
Sartre, as noted above, did not ignore this phenomenological 
approach. Moreover, he tried to reassess it through his own 
existentialist perspective. In this regard. Fell considers Sartre to 
be indebted to both Kierkegaard and Hegel. Fell notes that: "Sartre 
himself refers to existentialism as 'this idealist protest against 
idealism'" (1966, 233). Thus, he is indebted to Kierkegaard because 
his thought has at its centre the problem of the individual and his 
personal or subjective existence or his existence as "inwardness" 
which is something that most speculative philosophies, like Hegel's, 
overlook. Against Hegelianism, Kierkegaard urged that the distinction 
between being aind non-being be firmly maintained, on pain of losing 
the human proportion and perspective. The distinction between Being 
and Nothingness, as the title of Sartre's major work indicates, is 
something on which his philosophical work is based. However, praising 
Husserl and the phenomenological idea of "turning to the things in 
themselves", Sartre realized the importance of building a bridge 
between subject and object, between the individual and the world.
The link between human beings and the world is established, 
Sartre considers, through our emotions. In having an emotion we
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transform the world and for this we connect with it. Moreover, an 
emotion is a conscious transformation of the world. Emotion, he 
affirms, "is not an accident, it is a mode of our conscious 
existence, one of the ways in which consciousness understands its 
Being-in-the-World" (Sartre 197 6, 91). But emotion is also deceptive 
and ineffective because it is a fictitious relation. This amounts to 
saying that: "If Kierkegaard was right (against Hegel) in arguing 
that thought does not, by any kind of historical automatism, 
translate itself into reality, Hegel was right (against Kierkegaard) 
in arguing that thought can be translated into objective change, is 
not limited to isolated solipsistic decision" (Fell 1966, 234). Thus, 
even though Sartre's project starts with Kierkegaard, he finds that 
consciousness cannot be truly "free" if thought cannot be translated 
into objective change. By saying this Sartre is paying tribute to 
Hegel's speculative philosophy. Fell concludes: "Sartre is only able 
to see emotion as fictive idealism because he identified emotion with 
thought". (Ibid., 236)
Lyall and Sartre
The foregoing exposition of Sartre's theory of emotion 
provides us with a new framework in which Lyall's ideas about 
emotions can be analyzed. For Lyall the emotions and especially the 
emotion of love connects us with the world. Emotions are the link 
between our intellect and the phenomenal world. "Without emotion, in 
his view". Armour and Trott note, "the mind is empty, incapable of
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action. [Emotion] is to be welcomed in all its richness, and the 
hazards it presents by way of the stimulation of rash acts are to be 
faced cheerfully and without regret. Indeed, without emotion we would 
have no connection with the objective world" (1981, 79) . Lyall was 
interested in finding a way to bridge the gap between the subj ect and 
the object, between us, as humsin beings and the world. Sartre's 
endeavor is similar. Both wanted to produce a means for making human 
beings part of the world, in a more intimate and immediate way.
Both Sartre and Lyall were looking for a return to things in 
themselves. The only possibility through which this connection could 
be established is offered by the emotions. Lyall says of emotion, 
that :
[it] is not an idea; it is not an act of 
intellect, or exercise of intelligence; it is not 
memory; it is not imagination, although emotion 
accompanies every act of imagination, and is 
essential to it [...] An emotion is not a
sensation, although it is more nearly allied to
that than to what is purely mental or 
intellectual; while, again, it does not belong to 
that lower department of mind to which sensation 
is referable, and ranks higher than even the 
exercise of intelligence or intellect- Emotion is 
a higher state than pure intellect; not this or 
that emotion, but the region or susceptibility of 
emotion. (1855, 285)
Thus, in Lyall's view, emotion is a higher state than pure intellect
because, extended into the world, it grasps Being and informs the
intellect. Emotion cannot be reduced to imagination, even though 
imagination is "essential" when experiencing an emotion. Also, 
emotion is not the same as sensation, even though they present 
similar features.
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Emotions, for Lyall, reach out into the world; they are 
extensions into the world of our existence as both mind and body. Let 
us take, for example, the case of Armour and Trott explaining what 
Lyall means when he writes that love is an emotion that "terminates 
on being":
Suppose love could be conceived without reference 
to being itself. Then if it needed an object it 
would become relative to the occurrence of that 
object. But if it did not need an object, then it 
would not motivate us to seek the good. It would 
be a simple abstraction. But love is not in that 
way relative and it does motivate us. Therefore, 
we are not wholly without justification in 
supposing that we can go beyond particular things 
to being itself.(1981, 81)
That love goes "beyond particular things to being itself" in Lyall's 
view, implies to a certain extent a transformation of the world so 
that the gap between the subject and particular objects vanishes when 
we grasp, through emotions. Being itself. When experiencing the 
emotion of love which Lyall calls "the absolute emotion", we do not 
love what is accidental in the object of our love. Actually, it is 
wrong to speak of objects at all, Lyall considers, because love 
terminates on Being. "The one state of love exists; every object, 
every being, shares in its exercise: it has selected no object for 
its exercise; but every object receives a part of its regard as it 
comes within its sphere. In its most absolute character, being is its 
object" (Lyall 1855, 408). Our love is directed toward something that 
lasts, something that is not relative, namely Being, even though it 
presents to us in various forms.
Another emotion that Lyall emphasizes when talking about the 
"most powerful emotions" is sympathy. Lyall remarks that:
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We sympathize even with the aspects of nature, as 
these are indicative of certain feelings, whether 
essentially, or by arbitrary circumstances of 
association, and. we enter into the very mood of 
external creation. All nature speaks to us, has a 
voice and an aspect that we understand [_] The 
air, the earth, the water, all changes, and all 
seasons, speak to the mind, and impress their 
peculiar lessons, or beget their appropriate 
emotions. And we communicate our feelings again 
to outward objects. AJ.1 nature is joyous or sad 
as we are so ourselves. Half of its power over us 
is from ourselves. The internal mind is imaged on 
the external world. (Ibid., 4 61)
For Lyall, our emotions are attuned to Nature. We are sympathetic to 
the changes in Nature and Nature itself changes according to our 
emotions. A beautiful day can make us happy. However, when we are 
sad, the whole world looks gray. What Lyall wrote above, that the 
"internal mind is imaged on the external world" is something that 
brings him at least momentarily very close to Sartre's view on this 
matter. Sartre too, in The Wall, describes Pablo Ibbieta who is 
imprisoned, waiting for his execution. The hero finds himself in a 
world which does not have any appeal. Everything is gloomy and bleak. 
The people and the objects that previously were fascinating became 
dull, faint.
Lyall's approach, however, and this is crucial in understanding 
Lyall's position, differs from Sartre's in a very subtle way. Sartre 
stresses the dual nature of our body, first as an instrument but then 
also as something through which consciousness lives the world. By 
trying to conciliate this disparity he arrives at the idea of a 
magical world in which we project ourselves when experiencing an 
emotion as the following passage from Sartre's Sketch for a Theory of 
Emotions indicates :
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All emotions have this in common, that they evoke 
the appearance of the same world, cruel, 
terrible, bleak, joyful, etc., but in which the 
relations of things to consciousness are always 
and exclusively magical. We have to speak of a 
world of emotions as we have to speak of a world 
of dreams or of worlds of madness. (1976, 81)
Now the whole process is an illusory process. At least this is the 
conclusion that we reach if we try to understand Lyall only through 
Sartre's contribution to the analysis of emotions.
However, for Lyall, things are a bit different. For Lyall, as 
we saw above, love connects us with Being itself. Particularities are 
unimportant. Love endures the apparent changes in the object, it goes 
beyond accidents. "Love absolute", Lyall writes, "presents no 
modification, and exists for no purpose but itself" (Lyall 1855,
4 08). He points out the "unifying" nature of love. Through love we 
become part of the world, an integral part, that is. Thus, when 
loving, the features of the world change so that the world is seen 
not through its differences but through its similarities. The world 
is that which is, it is Being itself. Now, we know that every object 
receives a part of love. We also know that, as Lyall, says, "It is 
the soul, and the highest properties of the soul that are the true 
objects of love. The body can be but the index of these and it is 
when these attract through the external form, that love is worthy of 
the name" (Ibid., 4 07). What this position calls to mind is that 
Lyall seems to be a proponent of animism.
If love brings us in contact with the world and if love rests 
not on what changes but on Being itself, if the body is "an index" of 
the soul, then Lyall manages to avoid Sartre's failure. The world in
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which we dwell when experiencing an emotion is not a world made up of 
our projections. It is the world in its very essence.
What is fictitious in our relationship with the world when we 
are under the spell of emotions is not the relationship itself but 
the way the object is characterized. There is not and cannot be a 
fictitious interaction with the world but just a fictitious 
characterization of the object. The mundane relationship itself is a 
true relationship. Lyall does not see this as fictitious. It is 
independent of the characteristics of the objects in the world 
because it grasps Being, that which goes beyond particularities. The 
phenomenal world is not just a projection, as Sartre considers.
At this point we can see that for Lyall the Other is not 
really out there and that the Other is not really the other. Emotions 
integrate us into the world; they make us realize that we are a part 
of it. The Other is not "set at a distance" and there is no need to 
appropriate it, to make it ours. The "magical world" is magical 
because we find ourselves in it as identical and different from it at 
the same time and not because we project onto it.
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XXX. ON METAPHOR
In the case of metaphor, this redescription 
[of reality] is guided by the interplay 
between differences and resemblances that 
gives rise to the tension at the level of the 
utterance. It is precisely from this tensive 
apprehension that a new vision of reality 
springs forth, which ordinary vision resists 
because it is attached to the ordinary use of 
words. The eclipse of the objective, 
manipulable world thus makes way for the 
revelation of a new dimension of reality and 
truth.
Paul Ricoeur
We have seen that Lyall is able to provide the basis for a 
consistent theory of emotion, even though he did not develop it 
thoroughly. This is why Sartre's insight was welcomed. It offered a 
more advanced theoretical basis rooted in the phenomenological 
tradition and a more refined set of distinctions which when applied 
to Lyall's ideas made it possible for us to see more clearly how it 
is that through our emotions we are linked to the phenomenal world. 
However, this is not all there is in Lyall that deserves our 
consideration.
Besides emotions, there is the intellect which Lyall believed 
to be divorced from the world. This is where Lyall erred, because the 
intellect too brings its contribution to our interaction with the 
world. For Lyall, the mind in the imaginative state is composed of
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two parts — the intellectual part and the emotional part. In so far 
as it is intellectual it creates metaphors by having the ability to 
perceive analogies. The description of our ability to perceive 
analogies, putting disparate things under a single light in order to 
create new meanings, is nothing less than an incipient definition of 
metaphor.
In this chapter I will develop the above idea of metaphor and, 
by making more careful use of Paul Ricoeur's theory of metaphor, I 
will show that Lyall should not have sacrificed the creative power of 
the intellect for the inherited, Platonic view that keeps the 
intellect away from anything that involves it in an interplay with 
the phenomenal world.
This chapter begins with an exposition of various accounts of 
metaphor. Again, as in the previous chapter, my exposition will have 
as its goal the development of a theory that brings along not only a 
cognitive aspect but an emotional aspect as well and pays close 
attention to imagination. What interests me is finding a consistent 
relationship between metaphor and phenomenal reality.
The most suitable approach to an adequate theory of metaphor,
I consider, is the one offered by Paul Ricoeur. The French 
philosopher considers that metaphors can be regarded as statements 
and thus, that we can talk about their truthfulness. Moreover,
Ricoeur maintains that metaphors have the capability to reach 
reality, something that Lyall intuited but did not examine 
thoroughly.
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FOUR THEORIES OF METAPHOR
In his article on "Metaphor" in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(ed. Paul Edwards, 1972, vol. 5&6), Monroe C. Beardsley considers 
that we can talk about four distinctive theories of metaphor. They
are: the emotive theory, the comparison theory, the iconic
signification theory, and the verbal opposition theory. The purpose 
of going through this typology is to find whether there is a theory 
that construes metaphors in a way that is adequate to explain and
expand Lyall's ideas on the subject.
The Emotive Theory
The emotive theory is based on the fact that metaphors, in 
virtue of their deviant meaning, cannot be verified. From Aristotle's 
definition of metaphor which will be discussed later in this chapter, 
we find out that a metaphor is "the application to a thing of a name 
that belongs to something else". This ambiguity inherent in metaphor 
implies that metaphorical constructions are not capable of 
verification and therefore, they do not bear any cognitive meaning at 
all. Thus, what tells a metaphor apart from a non-metaphorical 
construction is the emotive meaning which springs up in the "process
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of relinquishing its cognitive or descriptive, meaning" (Beardsley 
1972a, 285) . For example, if we have the following two linguistic 
constructions: "Time is an uncle" and "Time is, of all modes of 
existence, most obsequious to the imagination" (Samuel Johnson), we 
can see that the first one is not a metaphor since there is no 
powerful emotive meaning attached to it. This is not the case with 
the second example which is where the emotive theory of metaphor 
stops. It does not go any further. It can be said that identifying 
metaphors is as far as it got. It does not say anything about what a 
metaphor is in itself. For example, the perception of time bowing to 
imagination, can rouse a certain emotion in ourselves on the basis of 
a tension between the perception of time and that of imagination. It 
also tells us that we can elude time by making use of our 
imagination, whereas seeing time as an uncle does nothing of the 
sort. Thus, there is knowledge to be gained through metaphor. This is 
what the representatives of the emotive theory overlooked, which is 
that metaphors have a cognitive side. They differ from nonsense 
constructions because they are bearers of cognitive meaning.
In sum, the emotive theory of metaphor, thus fails to provide 
a good basis for explaining individual metaphors. Emotions alone are 
not sufficient in this attempt. This theory represents a rudimentary 
approach "which has been broached, although never very thoroughly 
worked out", on Beardsley's assessment (Beardsley 1972a, 285).
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The Comparison Theory
This theory of metaphor, the comparison theory, is the 
opposite of the one above. It emphasizes the intelligibility of 
metaphor to the detriment of its emotional tension. Basically, in 
this view, metaphor does not differ very much from a simile. The only 
difference lies in dropping the use of words such "as" or "like" in 
metaphors. Thus, the metaphor "love is a red rose" can be rewritten: 
"love is like a red rose" and therefore, through the metaphor we 
compare two terms ("love" and the "red rose") . By doing this we are 
able to know something about "love", i.e., that it has some feature 
in common with the "red rose". According to Beardsley:
This comparison theory evidently makes the 
metaphorical attribution intelligible, but it has 
difficulties in explaining what is so special 
about it. There are two related possibilities.
One is to make a distinction between, say 'close' 
and 'remote' comparisons, and explain the tension 
in terms of remoteness: the tension is present 
when time is compared to a river (Heraclitus) or 
to a child at play (or when Bergson says that 
'real duration is that duration which gnaws on 
things, amd leaves on them the mark of its 
tooth' ) , but absent when time is compared with 
space. The criteria of remoteness have not proved 
easy to provide. A second possibility is to 
measure the degree of metaphoricalness (so to 
speak) as the inverse of relative frequency...But 
that, too, seems insufficient : even if one 
compared, for the first time, the color of a 
fruitcake to the color of a newly cleaned 
Rembrandt, a metaphor would not thereby be 
established. (Ibid., 285)
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Usually, the comparison theory of metaphor is associated with object 
comparison which means that metaphor focuses on comparing obj ects.
This implies that the connotations of the words used in metaphor 
derive from "what is generally true of the objects".
Now there are new difficulties that arise with this new theory 
which Beardsley quickly points out, this time in the essay The 
Metaphorical Twist (1972). For example, Beardsley cites from T.S. 
Eliot's Four Quartets: "frigid purgatorial fires/ Of which the flame 
is roses, and the smoke is briars" (Beardsley 1972b, 74) . Beardsley 
considers that:
some of the important marginal meanings of 
'briars' in the Eliot poem comes, of course, from 
the way the crown of thorns figures in the 
Christian story. And quite apart from its 
historical truth, the existence of that religion 
is sufficient to give the word that meaning. If 
in explicating this line we limit ourselves to 
what we know about briars, we would not fully 
understand it. (Ibid., 75)
One has to have some particular knowledge of the world in order to 
understand it. Not knowing what the connotation of the word "briars" 
is as it is used in this particular context, makes it impossible to 
grasp the metaphor. Another difficulty remarked upon by Beradsley is 
that "once we commit ourselves to finding, or supplying, an object to 
be compared with the subject of the metaphor we open the way for that 
flow of idiosyncratic imagery that is one of the serious barriers 
between a reader and a poem" (Ibid., 75).
These then are the flaws of the comparison theory. Just by 
comparing terms or objects even though sometimes we can arrive at 
something that is meaningful, that can be understood, we are not
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necessarily producing metaphors. It leaves aside any tensional 
element and any emotional component as well.
The Iconic Signification Theory
Out of the comparison theory grew the iconic signification 
theory which regards metaphor as involving a double semantic 
relationship. First, the modifier, which Beardsley defines as "the 
metaphorical predicate or term, whether noun or adjective", leads us 
to a specific occurrence or situation. Then, this occurrence or 
situation is brought forth as an iconic sign of the subject. An 
iconic sign should be understood in C.S. Pierce's sense, as a sign 
capable of signifying through its similarities to what it signifies. 
"The meaning of the metaphor", Beardsley explains, "is obtained by 
reading off the properties thus iconically attributed" (Beardsley 
1972a, 285) . For example, when saying that "Time is a river", the 
word "river" is used here so that it functions as an iconic sign for 
time, thus conferring on us an insight into the nature of time, 
namely that it is directed one-dimensionally, that it cannot be 
reversed, etc.
The trouble here, Beardsley thinks, is that the iconic theory 
imports a foreign object of a certain kind and thus it is subject to 
the difficulties arising with regard to what object works best in 
order to bring forth the full meaning of the metaphor. Moreover, the 
iconic signification theory, because it is based on the object 
comparison theory, allows for swaps between the modifier and the
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modified subject. Thus, in the example above "Time is a river", we 
can inverse the metaphor and say "The river is time". The only 
difference, Paul Henle, an exponent of the iconic signification 
theory, thinks is that sometimes, "the feeling tone is different". 
Beardsley objects: "I don't believe this will do: the difference 
between 'this man is a lion' and 'this lion is a man' is in what the 
different metaphorical modifiers attribute to the subjects" (1972b, 
78) . The examples above are not comparable to each other since in 
calling men lions and lions men we are not attributing the same 
properties from one to the other. The properties of lions that we 
attribute to men are different from the properties of men that we 
attribute to lions and therefore, the metaphor cannot be inverted.
The iconic signification theory of metaphor presents us with a 
refinement of the comparison theory in that it brings in a tensive 
moment created by putting together remote ideas. "Time" and "river", 
in the example above, are two remote ideas which are metaphorically 
connected. However, there is not enough place for a well defined 
emotive component since there is a difference in the "feeling tone", 
as Henle considers, when a metaphor is inverted. This difference 
however, does not take us too far because, in Henle's view, we would 
be dealing with the same metaphor : "this man is a lion" and "this 
lion is a man" are basically expressions of the same metaphor, even 
though there might be a slight difference in the "feeling tone".
There is, however, another attempt to explain metaphor for 
which the flaws encountered here are not a concern.
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The Verbal Opposition Theory
The fourth theory, the verbal opposition theory of metaphor, 
brings together words or phrases whose central meanings collide. They 
enter into a logical conflict and this is an indication of a 
necessary shift, a shift from the central meaning to the marginal 
meaning. Beardsley's view of metaphor with regard to this theory is 
that :
In many common words and phrases, we can roughly 
distinguish two sorts of meaning: (1) the central
meaning, or meanings - what is called designation 
or (in Mill's sense) connotation, and may be 
recorded in a dictionary as standard; and (2) the 
marginal meaning, consisting of those properties 
that the word suggests or connotes (in the 
literary critic's sense of this term) [_] This
theory thus rests upon (1) a distinction between
two levels of meaning, and (2) the principle that 
metaphor involves essentially a logical conflict 
of central meanings. (Beardsley 1972, 286)
This conflict is what alerts us to the fact that the word or phrase 
has to be taken metaphorically. It is what Beardsley calls "the
metaphorical twist". This approach to metaphor, however, does not
allow for words to acquire new meanings because words come into play 
with a series of meanings which are either central or marginal and as 
a result of the logical opposition we pick from the "repertoire of 
marginal meanings (and from the non-conflicting part of the central 
meaning) those properties that can sensibly be attributed to the 
subject-thing, and so read the metaphor as making that attribution"
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(Beardsley 1972a, 286). Foreseeing this problem, Beardsley expanded 
the theory offering in his essay The Metaphorical Twist a revised 
version of the verbal opposition theory.
Metaphor, Beardsley considers, brings into play some properties 
of the words or phrases used in its structure that were not 
previously in the foreground of the meaning. He explains that there 
are at least three steps that make up this process:
In the first stage we have a word and properties 
that are definitely not part of the intension of 
that word. Some of those properties are eligible 
to become part of the intension, to join the 
range of connotation. In order to be eligible 
they have to be fairly common properties...When the 
word comes to be used metaphorically in a certain 
sort of context, then what was previously only a 
property is made, at least temporarily into a 
meaning. And widespread familiarity with that 
metaphor, or similar ones, can fix the property 
as an established part of the meaning [...] When a 
connotation becomes so standardized for a certain 
types of context, it may be shifted to a new 
status, where it becomes a necessary condition 
for applying the word in that context. It 
constitutes a new standard. (Beardsley 1972, 84)
Thus, at first, a word has a definite set of properties that make up 
the intension of that word. Then, other properties are brought forth 
inasmuch as they could, potentially, become part of that word's 
intension. Then, when that word is used metaphorically, the property 
actually becomes part of the word's intension and therefore a new 
meaning is created.
To illustrate how this works, I will borrow Beardsley's 
example. He writes that the word 'warm' was extrapolated from the 
area of sensory experience and employed in describing human 
personality:
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I should think that the first application of 
'warm' to a person had to change some accidental 
properties of warm things into part of a new 
meaning of the word, though now we easily think 
of these properties as connotations of 'warm' - 
for example, approachable, pleasurable-in- 
acquaintance, inviting. These qualities were part 
of the range of connotations of 'warm' even 
before they were noted in warm things, which may 
not have been until they were noted in people and 
until someone, casting about for a word that 
would metaphorically describe those people, hit 
upon the word 'warm' But before those qualities 
could come to belong to the staple connotation of 
'warm', it had to be discovered that they could 
be meant by the word when used in an appropriate 
metaphor. (Ibid., 85)
Thus, in order to understand the metaphor "she is a warm person", one 
has to think of properties of the word "warm" such as inviting, 
approachable, etc., which initially were not among the connotations 
of this particular word. Through metaphorical use, the word expanded 
its range of meanings and became fuller.
Now, the verbal opposition theory of metaphor, even though it 
does not include an emotive component, seems to be a very elaborate 
approach to the study of metaphor allowing for metaphor to augment 
the use of words in a language, allowing for new meanings to occur, 
allowing for surprising ideas to emerge from the juxtaposition of 
words. Two exponents of this view are Colin Turbayne and Philip 
Wheelwright, both stressing the importance of metaphor in bringing 
forth new meanings for words or phrases. They also represent two 
opposed views on the relation between metaphors and reality. This 
controversial relation is of foremost importance because it 
represents the connection with Lyall's ideas.
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TDBBAXME, WHEELWRIGHT AND METAPHORICAL EEALITY
In this section, I will critically examine Turbayne and 
Wheelwright's approaches. Through criticism of their views I will 
arrive at Paul Ricoeur's theory which I consider is the most 
comprehensive one. Ricoeur retains what is fruitful from the above 
mentioned theories and tries to make them part of a very ambitious 
project which is represented by his monumental work The Rule of 
Metaphor (1977) . In order to give a crude preliminary description of 
his theory it should be mentioned that he manages to open a new 
dimension in the analysis of metaphor by linking it through a special 
use of imagination to the phenomenal world, and by according it the 
status of a statement by redefining Frege's sense and reference 
polarity. The issue of emotional meaning is also an integral part of 
Ricoeur's work. This brings us back to the framework of William 
Lyall's thought. Moreover, in as much as metaphors have an 
intellectual dimension, they do improve our relationship with the 
world. They augment the world itself, an insight that Lyall failed to 
achieve but nonetheless one which Ricoeur rightly emphasized.
Thus, I will start with the two different views on this issue, 
first that of Collin Turbayne, who develops a theory of metaphor 
based on the "as if" prescription and thus brings the whole 
discussion on metaphor to the field of reflective judgment. Then 
there is Philip Weelwright's theory which considers that metaphorical 
language, through its fluidity and tensiveness, is closely connected
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to "what is", that is, to the real. Then, by using these two theories 
as dialectical counterparts, I will try to bring them together in an 
act of synthesis, arriving finally at Paul Ricoeur's theory of 
metaphor.
The goal of this chapter is to show that metaphors do "reach" 
reality and that Lyall, instead of referring to the imaginative state 
as something that defies explanation, could have gone further and 
thus have realized that the intellect is not completely alienated 
from the phenomenal world because of its ability to create metaphors. 
Of course, Lyall's lack of the philosophical tools necessary to 
achieve this task, such as those of phenomenology and theory of 
metaphor, hampered him from developing these ideas. This chapter thus 
amounts to a critique of Lyall which should also be understood as a 
continuation of his thought.
Tu^ayne and. the kÿth of Metaphor
The classical definition of metaphor is the one given by 
Aristotle. For Aristotle, metaphors: "consist in giving the thing a 
name that belongs to something else; the transference (epi-phora) 
being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from 
species to species, or on the grounds of analogy" (Poetics 14 57 b 6- 
9) . For example, the expression "love is a red rose" is a metaphor.
To break down Aristotle's definition, we can see that the noun "love" 
is the focus of the metaphor. Something happens to it: it is 
explained, it is made understandable by employing a less abstract and
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more concrete term, the "red rose". We are dealing with a movement 
from an abstract concept to a term which can be grasped more easily 
by transferring one name onto the other. "Love", for the person 
experiencing this emotion is the same as a "red rose" for our 
experience of beauty: its rich color, its disposition of velvety 
petals, as well as its perfume make us want to have it as close as 
possible so we can enjoy its beauty. The same happens when in love - 
there is a state of intense longing for union with the other where 
the other represents everything that is beautiful and exciting. In 
this case, the transference happens "on the grounds of analogy" 
between love and the red rose.
Collin Turbayne begins his book The Myth of Metaphor (1970) by 
challenging Aristotle's definition. Turbayne is not satisfied with it 
because he identifies cases of metaphors that, in virtue of their 
existence, require that the definition be either broader or narrower. 
It should be broader because some metaphors do not have to be 
expressed in words. There can be metaphors that are expressed through
painting, sculpture, dance, etc. Turbayne explains:
Michelangelo, for example, used the figure of 
Leda, with the swan to illustrate being lost in 
the rapture of physical passion, and the same 
figure of Leda, only this time without the swan, 
to illustrate being lost in the agony of dying.
It will also allow the concrete physical models 
of applied scientists, the blackboard of 
teachers, the toy blocks of children that may be 
used to represent the battle of Trafalgar, and
the raised eyebrow of the actor that may
illustrate the whole situation in the state of 
Denmark, to be classified as metaphor. (Ibid.,
13)
In order to solve this problem, Turbayne takes "name" from the above 
definition to mean "a sign or a collection of signs" (Turbayne 1970,
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13) . Thus, for Turbayne, the act of transference (epi-phora) from 
Aristotle's definition does not occur from genus to species, or from 
species to genus, etc. but from a "sort" to other "sort". A "sort" is 
a particular kind, class or group and he calls the transference 
"sort-crossing". What this means is that now, every act of 
transference can be perceived as a metaphor. The outcome of building 
the metaphor on the basis of sort-crossing is that suddenly its whole 
meaning becomes unstable. "If the term metaphor be let apply to every 
trope of language, to every result of association of ideas and 
analogical reasoning, to architecture, music, painting, religion, and 
to all the synthetic processes of art, science, and philosophy, then 
indeed metaphor will be warred against by metaphor [...] and how then 
can its meaning stand?" (Bedell 1936, 103) . This would mean, as noted 
above, that every sort-crossing would be a metaphor and thus the 
definition of metaphor should be narrower. The solution, Turbayne 
considers, lies in the fact that every sort-crossing is just a 
potential metaphor. What makes a metaphor to be a metaphor is the "as 
if", the "make believe" which is inherently present in it . In the 
example used above, "love is a red rose" the metaphor exists in as 
much as the expression is taken to mean that love is "as if" it is a 
red rose. The "as if" prescription is implicit. It involves a certain 
level of awareness without which the metaphor does not occur to us. 
Thinking of love as being literally a red rose does not bring us into 
the presence of metaphor. What does, is perceiving- the similarity and 
being aware of it, knowing that things happen "as if" they are 
similar.
Turbayne's theory of metaphor "represents the facts [...] as if 
they belonged to one logical type or category (or range, or types of
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categories), when they actually belong to another". (Turbayne 1970,
18) . But this new definition happens to be the very definition that 
Gilbert Ryle gave, not for metaphor, but for the category mistake (or 
categorial confusion) . The metaphor finds its essence in the act of 
sort-crossing or duality of sense, but it does that by filling up the 
"as if" prescription, "fusing two senses by making believe there is 
only one sense".
Thus, metaphor on Turbayne's account shifts from being a 
category confusion to a "category fusion". What Turbayne means is 
that there is no mistake in self-consciously crossing sorts for 
otherwise all metaphors will be nothing but mistakes. This does not 
imply that one is right in "presenting the facts of one sort in the 
idioms of another without awareness" (Ibid., 22). This is plain 
confusion of disparate senses of a sign which surely does not give 
birth to a metaphor. If the question is when does a metaphor occur, 
then Turbayne replies that :
The answer lies in the as if or make-believe 
feature [...] When Descartes says that the world is 
a machine or when I say with Seneca that man is a 
wolf, and neither of us intends our assertions to 
be taken literally but only metaphorically, both 
of us are aware, first, that we are sort- 
crossing, that is, re-presenting the facts of one 
sort in the idioms appropriate to another, or, in 
other words, of the duality of sense. I say 'are 
aware', but of course, we must be, otherwise 
there can be no metaphor. We are aware, secondly, 
that we are treating the world and man as if they 
belong to new sorts. We are aware of the duality 
of sense in 'machine' and 'wolf', but we make 
believe that each has only one sense - that there 
is no difference in kind, only in degree, between 
the giant clockwork of nature and the pygmy 
clockwork of my wrist watch, or between man- 
wolves and timber wolves. (Ibid., 17)
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Thus there are two different ways for looking at the relationship 
between sorts: there is sort-crossing, which actually defines 
metaphor, and there is sort-trespassing which brings forth the issue 
of being used by the metaphor because in this case the "as if" 
prescription is overlooked and the metaphor is taken literally (see 
^pendix) .
It follows that being able to "see" the metaphor implies an 
awareness without which one merely gets lost in the midst of 
recognizing various senses of a sign. An example would be realizing 
the difference between "seeing the point of a needle and seeing the 
point of a joke". In that moment when only one of the two different 
senses fused is metaphorical but is taken literally, we are dealing 
with sort-trespassing, as Turbayne recognizes that:
The victim of metaphor accepts one way of sorting 
or building or allocating the facts as the only 
way to sort, bundle, or allocate them. The victim 
not only has a special view of the world but 
regards it as the only view, or rather, he 
confuses a special view of the world with the 
world. He is thus a metaphysician. He has 
mistaken the mask for the face. Such a victim who 
is a metaphysician malgré lui is to be 
distinguished from that other metaphysician who 
is aware that his allocation of the facts is 
arbitrary and might have been otherwise. (Ibid.,
27)
For Turbayne, the encounter with a metaphor provokes our awareness. 
We have to perform three operations in order to understand a 
metaphorical construction. We must be able, first, to spot the 
metaphor, to discover it in a text, in a work of art or in music. 
Then, we have to identify its literal interpretation and we have to 
point it out in order to get rid of it so that we are left with the
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metaphorical interpretation. After doing that we are then able to 
restore the metaphor as a metaphor, as something where the process of 
sort-crossing happens but this time with awareness of its occurrence.
Turbayne's theory of metaphor rests upon reflective judgment. 
His fear of being victimized by metaphor can only be eradicated if we 
are constantly aware and make use of the above operations. Metaphor 
is something that is created by breaking patterns, and making new 
connections instead of preserving old associations. This must be 
accompanied by the "vigilance of the as if", as Ricoeur puts it in 
The Rule of Metaphor (1977) .
To summarize, Turbayne is advocating a theory of metaphor in 
which every single use of sort-crossing must be very lucid and 
radically intellectual. He underlines this claim in The Myth of 
Metaphor as follows : "the main theme of this book is that we should 
constantly try to be aware of the presence of metaphor, avoiding 
being victimized by our own as well as by others" (Ibid., 217) . But 
how is it possible for a metaphor to present itself in its fullness 
and with all its power without us believing in its descriptive and 
representative value? Throughout his book, Turbayne is worried that 
we not fall prey to "believing" that which metaphor represents which 
will lead us to take the metaphor literally.
However, Ricoeur asks, "can one create metaphors without 
believing them and without believing that, in a certain way, 'that 
is'?" (Ricoeur 1977, 254). Should the creative dimension of language 
be divorced from the creative aspect of reality itself? Turbayne's 
prescription for metaphor limits imagination. It subjects it to the 
"philosophy of the as if". The spark fired by the metaphor in poetry, 
for example, is promptly put out the moment we become "aware" that it
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
93
is just an artifice which., once spotted, cannot have the power to 
lift us up on reverie's summit. When thinking about the 'love is a 
red rose' metaphor, Turbayne would like us to enjoy the cleverness of 
the construction. He remarks that "the invention of a metaphor full 
of illustrative power is the achievement of genius" (Turbayne 1970, 
57). On his account there should be nothing beyond this. The sole joy 
that we retrieve from metaphor should only be delivered by our 
capacity for reflective judgment. But there is more to metaphor than 
this. A lot more !
Philip Wheelwright's Metaphor and Reality
It is Philip Wheelwright's position, developed in his book 
Metaphor and Reality (1973) that there is a very strong relationship 
between language and phenomenal reality, and metaphor is that which 
illustrates it the best. Wheelwright adopts a position contrary to 
that of Turbayne. If Turbayne is prone to draw attention to what the 
metaphor is not, to make it clear that everything that pertains to 
metaphorical creation happens within the limits determined by the "as 
if". Wheelwright leans toward emphasizing what the metaphor is, how 
it is so very strongly intertwined with phenomenal reality. With 
Wheelwright, metaphor offers more than the kind of pleasure resting 
entirely on our capacity for reflective judgment. Through metaphor we 
become capable of being intimately connected with "What Is", as he 
writes, with what is reality and how it presents itself to us.
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For Wheelwright, reality can be described as having three 
important features: it is presential, it is coalescent and it is 
perspectival. The fact that reality is presential means that there is 
a sense of presence which can be felt with regard to another human 
being, another person, and toward, inanimate beings as well. The other 
is present for us not as an object, not as something out there, out 
of reach, but rather as something with which we are linked. We
experience the presence of the-other-than-us and we connect with it:
Every presence has an irreducible core of 
mystery, so long as it retains its presential 
character. Explanations, theories, and specific 
questionings are directed toward an object in its 
thinghood, not in its presentness. An object in 
its thinghood is characterized by spatio-temporal 
and causal relations to other objects in their 
thinghood: we inquire about its name, its 
place,its why and whither, its status according 
to some system of va lues ....When, on the other 
hand, two persons meet and their meeting is one
of mutual presentness, the essentiality of their
meeting has nothing to do with names and 
addresses..Uo multiplication of such details, 
however full and meticulous, can be a substitute 
for the real meeting....The same is true when no 
other human being is involved, and hence no 
assured mutuality. The sense of presence that 
occurs to one who catches a sudden glimpse of, 
say, a certain, contour of hills or of a red 
wheelbarrow in the rain, defies explanation; for 
when explanations are begun or sought the sheer 
presentness diminishes or disappears.
(Wheelwright 1973, 158-159)
Being open to sensing the presence of the surrounding world, means 
that the Cartesian dualism between mind and body does not hold any 
longer. As a consequence, there is something more here than just the 
mind as perceiving subject and the body as perceived object. Both of 
them are blended together, both of them are united; they are nothing
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but the two sides of a coin. Reality, for Wheelwright, surpasses 
distinctions like subject and object, or mind and body. Reality, he 
writes, "is That to which every [...] category tries to refer and which 
every philosophical statement tries to describe, always from an 
intellectual point of view and always with ultimate inadequacy"
(Ibid., 166-167).
The aspect of reality which emphasizes its unity. Wheelwright 
represents by using the term "coalescent". To coalesce means to grow 
together or into one body; to unite, join together. What Wheelwright 
seems to point out is that we are part of the world and we grow 
together with the environment. The mind/body dichotomy, or the 
subject/object split have unfortunate consequences. Wheelwright 
considers that it:
gives undue prestige to certain aspects of 
experience (those which we call collectively the 
'physical' aspects) at the expense of other and 
perhaps intrinsically more important aspects; 
moreover, it generates artificial questions. To 
ask (as philosophical aestheticians often do) 
whether the beauty of a rose is in the rose or in
the eye and mind of the beholder is palpably an
unreal question, for the concrete answer is 
'Both'; and if the answer looks contradictory, so 
much the worse for the dualistic structure of 
thought that makes it look so. The I who am aware 
and the that of which I am aware are but two 
aspects of a single sure actuality, as 
inseparable as the convex and the concave aspects 
of a single geometrical curve. (Ibid., 166)
What Wheelwright means is that the world is not an inert mechanical
object but a living field, an open and dynamic landscape. The world
does not derive from an impersonal or objective dimension of 
scientific facts. It is not a collection of data "from which all 
subjects and subjective qualities are pared away, but it is rather an
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intertwined matrix of sensations and perceptions" (Abram 1997, 39). 
Thus, we are not mere observers. We participate in reality.
The last feature of reality discussed by Wheelwright refers to 
it as being perspectival. The fact that reality possesses a 
perspectival and contextual character, implies that its nature is 
constantly problematic, it cannot be corseted within formulas or 
systematized. We, as complex human beings are diverse and we are also 
in the presence of a reality itself diverse and complex, we are part 
of it and thus we cannot postulate "a single type of reality as 
ultimate". For Wheelwright, it is evident that:
The communication of presential and coalescent 
reality is not possible by relying on words with 
inflexible meanings; if it is to be achieved at 
all (and the achievement is always imperfect at 
best) the common words must be chosen and 
contextualized with discriminating suitability.
Much of the context is constructed in the act and 
by the manner of saying forth; it is not all 
previously given. The fresh context may be 
regarded as an angle of vision, a perspective, 
through which reality can be beheld in a certain 
way, a unique way, not entirely commensurate with 
any other way. (1973, 170)
This brings us to the issue of language and, implicitly, to metaphor. 
Language, Wheelwright considers, in as much as it is used to express 
the complexity and tensivity of the physical world and also the 
complexity of human nature, is itself intricate, engulfed in tensions 
between suitable word combinations used to "represent some aspect or 
other of the pervasive living tension" (Ibid., 48). On Wheelwright's 
approach, language is itself alive, in continuous change because 
those who use it try to find better and simpler ways to express 
themselves or to reflect their relationship with the surrounding 
world. Wheelwright argues that:
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language that strives toward adequacy - as 
opposed to signs and words of practical intent or 
of mere habit - is characteristically tensive to 
some degree and in some manner or other. This is 
true whether the language consists of gesture, 
drawings, musical compositions, or (what offers 
by far the largest possibilities of development) 
verbal language consisting of words, idioms, and 
syntax. (Ibid., 46-47)
At the core of this strife within language is the metaphor. Quoting 
John Middleton Murry, Wheelwright refers to metaphor as being "as 
ultimate as speech itself, and speech as ultimate as thought". 
Metaphor is that which reflects best the tensive nature of language 
and, at the same time, that which provokes our thinking and 
imagination.
As we have seen above, where we presented Aristotle's 
definition, the metaphoric process implies a transfer, a movement 
within the semantic field of a specific sort to the semantic field of 
another. This transfer ("phora") has, as Wheelwright notes, two 
distinctive characteristics, a "double imaginative act of outreaching 
and combining that essentially marks the metaphoric process" (Ibid., 
72). But these two components of metaphor appear, in the most 
eloquent cases as working together and thus, they should not be 
regarded separately but rather as two dimensions of metaphor.
However, in order to better understand them. Wheelwright names and 
analyzes them one at a time. Their names are epiphor, which stands 
for "the outreach and extension of meaning through comparison" and 
diaphor, meaning "the creation of a new meaning by juxtaposition or 
synthesis".
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^xphor
The metaphor as epiphor in its essence does nothing more than 
express a similarity between two different terms where one of them 
has a commonly known sense and is used as a vehicle to shed light on 
a more important but, at the same time, more difficult to comprehend 
term, the tenor. Thus, by easily bringing in a context, epiphoric 
metaphor make-believes something about something else which is 
usually obscurely known. For example, when Seneca said that "Man is a 
wolf", he did not mean that the sort "man" is included in the sort 
"wolf", but rather by transferring the name "wolf" to the name "man", 
he asserted something about human nature, namely that it shares some 
characteristics with the nature of the wolf. This is a metaphor 
because here there are two distinct ideas between which, through the 
act of transference, a connection is realized which is not valid in 
the case of "the Tasmanian wolf is a wolf" where "the Tasmanian wolf" 
is a sort included in a larger sort, the one of "wolf" with which it 
shares similar characteristics. It is in the latter instance when the 
word "wolf" is taken in its literal meaning while it is in the former 
where it is taken metaphorically.
Therefore, the epiphoric metaphor assumes a similarity between 
the modifier (wolf) and the modified (man) and it is primarily based 
on their comparison. But, as Wheelwright points out, these two 
elements of similarity and comparison need not be obvious, nor 
explicit. If they are, the tension provoked by the transference would 
be diminished and the metaphor would lose its depth. "A tensive 
vibrancy can be achieved only where an adroit choice of dissimilars 
is made, so that the comparison comes as a shock which is yet a shock
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of recognition" (Ibid., 75). This is what gives "freshness" to the 
epiphoric metaphor at its best. When saying that "Time is a river", 
there are no obvious similarities between "time", which is an 
abstract notion and "river", which has a concrete, empirical 
experience. Connecting these two terms comes as a surprise at first 
but soon, when considering the flow of the river as being similar to 
the flow of time, we realize the depth of the metaphor.
Another source for vitality is offered by synesthesis, a term 
which expresses the working together of different sense organs. 
Synesthesis leads to creation of metaphors. Wheelwright considers, 
"since the comparison of one type of sense-impression with that given 
by a different sense-organ stirs the reader to reflective 
contemplation along two of his avenues of sense at once" (Ibid., 76) . 
Examples of synesthetic expressions are "bitter colors", "gray 
whispers", "green smells", etc.
Diaphor
Besides this kind of transference through comparison, there is 
another one which Wheelwright calls "diaphor" (from the Greek dia - 
through), In this case, the semantic movement takes place not by 
comparing, but by juxtaposing distinctive sorts. Taken alone, as 
parts, the elements of the metaphor do not say anything but at the 
moment when they are put together a whole new meaning is unveiled. As 
an example, let us take Descartes' rhetorical statement in The World, 
chapter VI, where he writes about the world as being a machine: "Give 
me extension and motion and I will construct the world" (Cited by 
Turbayne 1970, 67).
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Descartes presents us with a relation between the world as 
extension and the world as motion which put together, juxtaposed and 
metaphorically interpreted gives us an idea about the world's 
essence. There can be detected a contrast between extension and 
motion. But only when they are put together can they give us 
something new. Leaving aside whether Descartes perceived this as a 
metaphor or not, it is obvious that by using the combination of 
expressions he was able to produce a new meaning for the concept 
"world". The world, for Descartes, is that which has not only 
extension but motion as well.
However, the best examples of diaphoric metaphor are to be 
found in an area of artistic production such as abstract painting, 
where combinations of colored lines or brush strokes or paint spills 
open up different spaces transforming canvas' bidimensional space 
into a four dimensional continuum, where tridimensional coordinates 
are enriched with the addition of an inner, personal time or music, 
where the juxtaposition of various instruments and voices creates an 
emotionally meaningful state in the listener. Thus, for Wheelwright:
[t]he essential possibility of diaphor lies in 
the broad ontological fact that new qualities and 
new meanings can emerge, simply come into being, 
out of some hitherto ungrouped combination of 
elements. If one can imagine a state of the 
universe, perhaps a trillion years ago, before 
hydrogen atoms and oxygen atoms had ever come 
together, it may be presumed that up to that time 
water did not exist. Somewhere in the later 
vastitude of time, then, water first came into 
being - when just those two necessary elements 
came together at last under the right conditions 
of temperature and pressure. Analogous novelties 
occur in the sphere of meanings as well. As in 
nature new qualities may be engendered by the 
juxtaposition of previously un-joined words and 
images. (Ibid., 85-86)
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However, pure diaphoric metaphor can hardly be found. It rather 
exists in combination with epiphoric metaphor. Together, they can 
bring different sorts close.
Through the comparison virtues of epiphor and through the fresh 
juxtaposition of "several vehicular images" of diaphor, new meanings 
emerge. As an example, the following text from the reflective poetry 
of Egyptian Pyramids can illustrate the collaboration of epiphor and 
diaphor:
Death is in my eyes today:
As in a sick man beginning to recover 
From a deep illness. (Erman 1927, 10)
Thus, the phrase "death is in my eyes today" represents an epiphor. 
However, taking separately the rest of the verse: "As in a sick man 
beginning to recover/ From a deep illness" we will find that it is 
not a metaphor. Only in combination with the first part it can be 
regarded metaphorically. The whole verse is a diaphor.
The essential character of the metaphor, as Wheelwright sees 
it, is the ability to provoke a tension which, as Ricoeur put it, 
"guaranties the very transference of meaning and gives poetic 
language its characteristic of semantic 'plus-value', its capacity to 
be open towards new aspects, new dimensions, new horizons, new 
meanings" (Ricoeur 1977, 250). The epiphor and the diaphor are the 
revolving electrons around the nucleus of metaphor's meaning.
To sum up, it can be affirmed that throughout Metaphor and 
Reality, Wheelwright continuously stresses the "tensive" character of 
language. To illustrate this, he makes use of words like "living", 
"alive" or "intense" which all are meant to cast a light on the fact
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that language is so similar to life, to what is real, to "What Is". 
Language and "What Is" have analogous ontological features and this 
entitles Wheelwright to think of metaphor, since it represents best 
these features of the tensive language, as having the power to reach 
reality.
However, Wheelwright's account of the connection between 
reality and language reflected through metaphor cannot surpass the
trap of an "ontological naiveté", Ricoeur considers in The Rule of
Metaphor. The power of the dialectic between diaphor and epiphor 
which started Wheelwright's analysis fades away when the 
"intuitionist and vitalist tendency" is disclosed toward the end of 
his book. Ricoeur thinks that:
Wheelwright is not wrong to speak of 'presential 
reality', but he neglects to distinguish poetic 
truth from mythic absurdity. He who does so much 
to have the 'tensional' character of language 
recognized misses the 'tensional' character of
truth, by simply substituting one notion of truth
for another; accordingly, he goes over to the 
side of abuse by aproximating poetic textures 
simply to primitive animism. (Ibid., 255)
Thus, Ricoeur reproaches Wheelwright arguing that his account, even 
though bold in its attempt, is disappointing in its outcome. For 
Wheelwright, Ricoeur thinks, the border between language and the 
world is blurred to such an extent that it has almost vanished. Words 
and therefore, metaphors and things are essentially similar. In this 
respect. Wheelwright went too far, abusing the tensional use of 
language, overemphasizing the strong correlation between metaphor and 
reality and thus failing to observe the differences between the two. 
Now Ricoeur uses Wheelwright's approach to metaphor in opposition to 
Turbayne's and considers them as steps of a dialectical process. He
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brings them together in order to shape his own theory of metaphor. We 
pointed out what he finds unsatisfactory in Wheelwright's approach.
As regards Turbayne, "abuse is [...] the 'myth' of his title, in a more 
epistemological than ethnological sense, scarcely differing from what 
we just called ontological naiveté" (Ibid., 251). Turbayne's thesis, 
that metaphorical constructions are purely intellectual 
constructions, implies that they do not refer to reality differently 
than scientific formulas. Turbayne's approach is always concerned 
with truth from an epistemological perspective which makes his 
endeavor very similar to the positivism that he criticizes. Turbayne 
leaves no room for poetic language which breaks through "the very 
notions of fact, object, reality and truth, as delimited by 
epistemology. Turbayne's metaphor still belongs to the order of the 
manipulable. It is something we choose to use, to not use, to re-use. 
This power to decide, coextensive with the absolute hold of the 'as 
if', is without analogue on the side of poetic experience, in which 
imagination is 'bound'" (Ibid., 253).
Thus we have Turbayne's position on the one hand, and 
Wheelwright's, on the other. Turbayne stresses what metaphor is not 
by emphasizing that metaphorical constructions are purely 
intellectual products with no real reference whereas Wheelwright 
emphasizes what metaphor is by stressing the fact that metaphors are 
deeply rooted in the natural world. The former wants us to be aware 
of the "as if" prescription of the metaphor; the latter discovers 
deeper connections between metaphor and "What Is".
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ENTER RICOEUR!
After the analyses of metaphor by writers such as Collin 
Turbayne, Philip Wheelwright and, as we will see, Paul Ricoeur, 
metaphor does not allow itself to be regarded as a simple ornament 
that conveys no new meaning, that has nothing to do with reality or 
with our relationship to it. Ricoeur breaks away from the traditional 
understanding of metaphor which started shortly after Aristotle and 
culminated with Romanticism.
Metaphor brings remote ideas together into a unity and it does 
that by following the guidance offered by their likeness, as we have 
seen above, for example, when "time" and "river" were brought 
together in the metaphor "Time is a river". The fact that the remote 
ideas are alike implies that they are, at the same time, similar and 
different. In a metaphor, different ideas melt and their likeness 
acts as a catalyst. In this way, metaphor acts like a screen or a 
filter in the discursive process. Finally, Ricoeur brings us face to 
face with a new structure of reality. This new structure made visible 
by the metaphor emerges on the ruins of the previous structure to 
which the remote ideas previously belonged, as we will see below.
Reference: Metaphors and Reality
Metaphors are philosophically relevant, argues Ricoeur, 
because they create new meanings, because they are innovative. With
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Ricoeur the approach to metaphor implies a change of view inasmuch as 
he brings forth a new understanding of sense and of reference, of 
imagination, to which he adds an emotive dimension.
Ricoeur upgrades Gottlob Frege's distinction between sense 
and meaning (where the sense is what the proposition states; the 
denotation, or meaning, is that about which the sense is stated) into 
one between sense and reference. For Ricoeur, sense results from a 
largely horizontal, semantic proceeding and identifies an entry in 
the imaginary cultural encyclopedia constituting what can be called a 
metaphoric proposition. Reference is "[metaphor's] claim to reach 
reality" (Ricoeur 1980, 140), even if often a redefined reality. It 
adds to sense an emotional and imaginative and pragmatic verticality. 
For Ricoeur, "the literary work through the structure proper to it 
displays a world only under the condition that the reference of 
descriptive discourse is suspended. Or, to put it another way, 
discourse in the literary work sets out its denotation, by means of 
the suspension of the first level denotation of discourse" (Ricoeur 
1977, 221). Thus, for Ricoeur, there are two distinct possibilities 
to refer to the issue of reference, or denotation with regard to 
metaphorical statements.
In The Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur contrasts Gottlob Frege's 
approach, with Emile Benveniste's. He begins with the question: "What 
does the metaphorical statement say about reality? This question 
carries us across the threshold from the sense towards the reference 
of discourse" (Ibid., 216). In other words, in order to know how 
metaphors relate to reality we have to find out first to what they
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Following Frege's article On Sense and Reference (1960), we 
realize that the reference, as Ricoeur puts it, "is communicated from 
the proper name to the entire proposition, which, with respect to 
reference, becomes the proper name of a state of affairs" (Ibid.,
218) . Proper names "pick up" objects in the world, they stand for or
'eslgnate their reference and, because their reference is 
communicated to the entire proposition, that is, the entire 
metaphorical statement, we cannot talk about metaphors without 
referring to proper names. Thus, when we use a proper name, like "the
Moon", we do not refer to our idea of the moon nor to a specific
mental event corresponding to it. Nor do we refer to some kind of 
ideal object "irreducible to any mental event" which we "presuppose 
besides a reference". It is Frege's understanding that:
The sentence 'Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca 
while sound asleep' obviously has a sense. But 
since it is doubtful whether the name 'Odysseus' , 
occurring therein, has reference, it is also 
doubtful whether the whole sentence has one [...]
For it is of the reference of the name that the
predicate is affirmed or denied. Whoever does not 
admit the name has reference can neither apply 
nor withhold the predicate. (1960, 62=63)
Thus, once a name in a sentence has no clear reference then the whole 
sentence lacks reference. Frege considers that our quest for truth, 
our "intention on speaking and thinking" demands a reference, it 
demands that we "advance from sense to reference". However, this 
demand causes us to err, Ricoeur thinks. "This striving for truth 
suffuses the entire proposition, to the extent that it can be 
assimilated to a proper name; but it is via the proper name as 
intermediary that, for Frege, the proposition has reference" (Ricoeur 
1977, 218). Thus, because Odysseus has no reference, the sentence
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"Odysseus is a journey" or any metaphorical statement that has the 
word Odysseus in it, would have no reference either which means that 
they are mere intellectual productions. This Ricoeur considers to be 
a limitation of Frege's position.
However, Ricoeur brings forth Emil Benveniste's theory of 
reference in order to break away from these limitations. In the 
second volume of Problèmes de linguistique générale (1974),
Benveniste writes: "Le sense d'un mot consistera dans sa capacité 
d'être 1'integrant d'un syntagme particulier et de remplir une 
fonction propositionelle" (Benveniste 1974, 227). Moreover, for 
Benveniste, the sense of the words in a sentence "résulte précisément 
de la manière dont ils sont combinés" (Ibid.). What does this mean? 
Benveniste considers that taken in isolation, words have only a 
potential meaning which is only actualized when it is used in a 
sentence. The potential meaning is made up of all the marginal 
meanings that a word can have depending of the diversity of contexts 
in which they can be used. Then, when they are put together in a 
sentence this multitude of potential meanings is reduced to just the 
meaning functioning in the "instance of discourse", i.e., a given 
sentence.
It is now obvious why Benveniste's view is contrasted with 
Frege's. For Frege the sentence would play the role of a proper name. 
By this I mean that the sentence itself being composed of words with 
specific meaning designates its reference. On the other hand, for 
Benveniste, the reference of a sentence attributes meaning to the 
words in its composition. Ricoeur explains that:
These two conceptions of reference are 
complementary and reciprocal, whether one rises 
by synthetic composition from the proper name
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towards the proposition, or whether one descends 
by analytic dissociation from the sentence to the 
semantic unit of the word. At their intersection, 
the two interpretations of reference make 
apparent the polar constitution of the reference 
itself, which can be called the object when the 
referent of the name is considered, or the state 
of affairs if one considers the referent of the 
entire statement". (1977, 218)
By bringing Benveniste's position into discussion, Ricoeur is able to 
distinguish between two sorts of reference - there is the first level 
reference, represented by Frege's approach and the second level 
reference recognized in Benveniste's approach. The metaphorical 
statement is the most adequate illustration of this split between 
levels of reference or denotation. Metaphors acquire their 
metaphorical meaning and achieve their reference on the ruins of 
literal meaning and literal reference. Ricoeur explains that:
If it is true that literal sense and metaphorical 
sense are distinguished and articulated within an 
interpretation, so too it is within an 
interpretation that a second level reference, 
which is properly the metaphorical reference, is 
set free by means of the suspension of the first 
level reference. (1977, 221)
For example, if we take the metaphor "Odysseus is a journey", then we 
can see that, literally interpreted (i.e., following Frege), it would 
have no impact on the way we perceive or relate to reality because 
Odysseus has no reference. On the other hand, taken metaphorically, 
"Odysseus is a journey" describes a new way of relating to reality, a 
new way of looking at human beings and their struggle to arrive 
"home".
If metaphor is this dialectical corrective of all analytical 
language centered on concepts then, as all language it also refers.
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among other things, to what a given culture and ideology consider as 
reality. This means that some conclusions to which any metaphor can 
lead are pertinent to or culturally "true" to given understandings of 
relationships in practice. Metaphor can affirm such an understanding 
or, in the best case, develop "the before un-apprehended relations of 
things" in ways at that moment not otherwise able to be formulated. 
For example, saying that "love is a warm feeling" we use warm in a 
different way than it is usually used and thus, we establish a new 
relation between "love" and "feeling".
Such is the split between the two kinds of reference. However, 
Ricoeur does not stop here. When talking about the re-descriptive 
power of the intellect which makes it possible to claim that 
metaphors do reach reality, we have to ask ourselves how do they come 
to light? What is it that makes it possible for the intellect to 
create, to bring forth novel ideas, novel meanings? In order to 
answer this question we have to see how Ricoeur understands 
imagination to work.
Imagination
We have seen above that in the metaphorical use of language we 
come across an innovation at the level of reference. Now, metaphor 
relates our image of reality given to us through perception to the 
image of reality that is offered by language.
Ricoeur takes imagination to mean what Kant meant when he used 
this concept. The act of imagination is that which puts the spatial-
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temporal determination of phenomena in correspondence with the 
conceptual determination of phenomena. Spatial-temporal 
determinations are blind on their own. Conceptual determination is 
empty when taken by itself. The act of imagination is fusing them 
together and thus allows us to grasp the phenomena. With Kant, 
imagination is no longer the faculty with which we reproduce images. 
It is no longer just reproductive imagination. Gilles Deleuze, 
discussing the process of imagination as understood by Kant,
considers that "When I say: I imagine my friend Pierre, this is the
reproductive imagination. I could do something else besides imagine 
Pierre, I could say hello to him, go to his place, I could remember 
him, which is not the same thing as imagining him. Imagining my 
friend Pierre is the reproductive imagination" (Deleuze 1978).
However, Kant recognizes that imagination has another function. It is 
also productive, working as a kind of synthesis. Deleuze explains 
Kant's concept of productive imagination as:
determining a space and a time in conformity to a 
concept, but in such a way that this 
determination cannot flow from the concept 
itself; to make a space and a time correspond to
a concept, that is the act of the productive
imagination. What does a mathematician or a 
geometer do? Or in another way, what does an 
artist do? They're going to make productions of 
space-time. (Deleuze 1978)
Thus, in productive imagination, spatial-temporal determinations do 
not merely follow conceptual determinations. There is a "production 
of space and time", as Deleuze put it, that goes beyond the space and 
time of any given phenomena and that is how the imagination is 
productive.
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Now, when Ricoeur distinguishes image as replica from image as 
fiction, this distinction corresponds to that between Kant's 
reproductive imagination and productive imagination. These two refer 
to different things and to mistake the one for the other is a 
fallacy. The image as replica, as portrait, is the image that we get 
through perception. It refers to a specific something that exists in 
the realm of reality. Thus, I can imagine my dog, the one I used to 
have a couple of years ago. The image I have here and now rests upon 
the corresponding perception of the real dog I had. The same dog 
whose presence used to be given in the past is now given in absence.. 
Or, as Ricoeur puts it, "absence and presence are modes of givenness 
of the same reality". Now, the other sort of image, the image as 
fiction, does not rest upon a given model. It does not refer to 
anything that was already given as original. In the image as fiction, 
again, we deal with an absent thing, but this time the absent thing 
represents nothingness. We imagine the centaur but it exists nowhere. 
It is unreal, even though we can have an image of it. Thus, the image 
of my dog rests on the absence of its object, whereas the image of 
the centaur rests on the unreality of its object. My dog is real; the 
centaur is unreal. Ricoeur considers that "the nothingness of absence 
concerns the mode of givenness of a real thing in absentia, the 
nothingness of unreality characterizes the referent itself of the 
fiction" (1991, 120).
The image as fiction refers to reality in a new way. This is 
why we have to distinguish it from the image as replica. The image as 
replica "reproduces" reality, whereas the image as fiction "produces" 
reality. There is a productive reference at work in fiction. Ricoeur 
considers it to be the case that:
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fiction changes reality, in the sense that it 
both 'invents' and 'discovers' it, [which] could 
not be acknowledged as long as the concept of 
image was merely identified with that of picture. 
Images could not increase reality since they add 
no referents other than those of their originals. 
The only originality of the image had thus to be 
found in the spontaneity characteristic of the 
production of the image. (Ibid., 121)
Imagination is thus productive, not only reproductive. And it is 
productive in as much as thought is involved, in as much as language 
is challenged. When I imagine my dog and reproduce his image, there 
is no further labor involved in the process. However, when I produce 
an image, when I describe an unreal object, when I tell a story, when 
I make a plan or make a model, I have to make use of my intellectual 
capacity. Imagination is productive not only of unreal objects, but 
also of an unexplored vision of reality. "Imagination at work - in 
work - produces itself as a world" (Ibid., 123).
To sum up, metaphor is that which relates reality and 
language, an expanded reality and a dynamic language, that is. This 
takes place with the help of imagination which does not reproduce 
images but rather produces new ones. Inasmuch as imagination is 
productive, it allows us to see similarities between the remote ideas 
that make up metaphors. "Man is a wolf", says Seneca. We can only 
understand what he meant not by simply having a mental picture of a 
wolf-like man but by emphasizing relations in a depicting mode. 
Moreover, imagination is helpful when it comes to putting in brackets 
the first level reference, the literary reference, allowing for the 
projection of new possibilities of redescribing the world.
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I.XALI. AMD METAPHORS
Now, let us see how Lyall fits into all this. For Lyall, a 
human being as a whole is both capable of intellectual effort and 
capable also of emotional experience. Thus it would appear that in 
the imaginative state one would assert one's existence in full. Why? 
Because in this case, one is re-affirming one's presence in the world 
by re-describing it and living it from within. We see that for Lyall, 
imagination has to do more with the production of images and less 
with their reproduction:
The ghosts and fairies, the gnomes and other 
imaginary beings of a rude state of society, owe 
their origin to the activity of this principle, 
united with the suggestions of a superstitious 
fear. In certain circumstances the imagination is 
ready enough, in the most cultivated age, to body 
forth these imaginary creatures, and to entertain 
a certain dread which it requires some effort of 
reason to counteract. It is in those very places 
where the imagination has most scope to operate, 
or most suggestives to its action, that we find 
the superstitions prevailing which are connected 
with the existence and the exploits of the beings 
of imagination. (Lyall 1855, 275)
As we can see, for Lyall, imagination is "ready enough to body forth 
these imaginary creatures". It is the act of producing them which is 
the big task of imagination. By doing that, in this particular 
example, it stirs our emotions and it makes us participate in a new 
aspect of reality. But it also "requires some effort of reason" to 
counteract. It involves thus our intellect in as much as it has to 
relate to and deal with expanded reality, a reality which was created
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in the first place by the mind in its activity of perceiving 
analogies, of animating and personifying nature. However, Lyall does 
not fully analyze his findings. He is content with just exposing the 
difficulty of understanding the inner workings of the imagination. 
"Why [does imagination works as it does]? It is impossible to say", 
he writes (Ibid., 274).
However, it seems that Lyall, linking the intellect and the 
emotions in the imaginative state took a step further from the 
Romantic mainstream. For the Romantics, understanding rests upon the 
connection with the spirit that is behind any creation. Lyall 
embraces this attitude but, if he had developed his ideas, he could 
have come to the conclusion that imagination not only connects with 
reality but also augments it, makes it fuller, more meaningful and 
diverse. Through language, through the creation of metaphors, which 
is a feature of the intellect, one improves one's relationship with 
the world and not only mirrors it. Through our emotions we are 
intimately connected with it.
In a lecture given in 1825 at the opening of the Free Church 
College of Halifax later to be Dalhousie University, Lyall talks 
about the "philosophy of thought" and he says, when drawing on the 
importance of language :
What an adaptation between the mind and its modes 
of expression! How the one fills the other with 
life and meaning ! - while the latter, again, 
suits every varying idea and emotion of the 
former - now rouses with energy, and now soothes 
with pleasure, or transports with delight. Having 
found such a vehicle, mind freely expatiates in 
every region. How much we owe to language perhaps 
cannot be told, for the excursiveness of mind - 
for the fineness of its imaginations and the 
subtlety of its conceptions. (Lyall 1853, 5)
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Moreover, "a thought often lies in the state of a feeling till a 
word, or words, evoke it from its recess" (Ibid., 5). As can be seen
again, emotions which connect us with phenomenal reality are also
linked with thoughts.
It is Lyall's opinion that the only way for these connections 
among emotions, phenomenal reality and thoughts to be expressed 
linguistically is when we make use of our imagination:
There is a period of its history when Imagination 
has to do with outward forms and semblances, as 
expressive of inward thoughts and feelings: but 
there comes a time when the most subtle and 
evanescent feelings or conceptions are made the 
symbols of material objects or ideas; or, these
objects or ideas are expressed or conveyed under
the most subtle conceptions of the mind. Between 
Homer and Wordsworth, or Shelley, there seems the 
interval to which we have here alluded:
Shakespeare may be said to unite to two periods.
Terms are applied to objects or circumstances to 
which they could never have been suitable, but 
for the abstract sense that has been assigned to 
them, from the subtle analogies which the mind 
can perceive between even the most material and 
the most spiritual circumstances or objects.
(Ibid., 6)
Poetic creations, as those of Homer, Shakespeare, Wordsworth or 
Shelley, built on the extensive use of metaphors are thus at the 
center of Lyall's attention. He is able to realize that metaphorical 
language, mastered by the intellect, under the spell of productive 
imagination has the power to creatively improve our relationship with 
the world.
However, Lyall does not follow up this discovery of the 
enormous creative capacity of imagination. He does not spend much 
time explaining how it works because of the limits of his exposition
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and because of he considered the faculty of imagination to be 
incomprehensible as such. Imagination avoids a purely intellectual 
approach since it is a composite of both intellect and emotions. 
Another reason would be his presupposition that the intellect itself 
is divorced from reality. Therefore, instead of sacrificing the 
Platonic view about the intellect i.e., considering it as 
transcending the world which is given to us in space and time, 
instead of sacrificing the intellect as representing order and as 
being an eternal principle, he sacrifices the creative power of the 
intellect.
The Emotive Dimension
For Lyall though, in the imaginative state, the intellect 
works together with the emotions. Moreover, Ricoeur, in his theory of 
metaphor, links the two as well. However, he talks about feelings:
To feel, in the emotional sense of the word, is 
to make ours what has been put at a distance by 
thought in its objectifying phase. They 
[feelings] are not merely inner states but 
interiorized thoughts... Its function is to abolish 
the distance between knower and known without 
cancelling the cognitive structure of thought and 
the intentional distance which it impels. Feeling 
is not contrary to thought. It is thought made 
ours. (Ricoeur 1980, 154)
Now, we have seen that Lyall does not distinguish drastically between 
feelings and emotions and that his basic idea at work in the theory
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of emotion is that emotion is not opposite to thought. Quite the 
contrary, emotion is that which informs the intellect about what, for 
the intellect "is at a distance", i.e. the phenomenal world. Through 
emotion we become closer to the world.
Thus, Lyall and Ricoeur seem to be in agreement with regard to 
the idea that through emotion we become closer to the world, with the 
difference that Ricoeur develops this idea and completes his theory 
of metaphor. By following Ricoeur's thought I intend to expand 
Lyall's insight and make it more complete along the lines of 
Ricoeur's theory.
For Ricoeur, feelings accompany imagination by adding to the 
"seeing as" what Ricoeur calls the dimension of "feeling as". In 
imagination, as shown above, we "see" similarities in remote ideas, 
we grasp the "mixture of like and unlike, proper to similarity". 
Feeling is thus not just something that pertains exclusively to what 
happens to the body, or just something that rests on a state of mind. 
Feeling, by accompanying imagination, is part of us as knowing 
subjects. "We feel like what we see like" (Ibid., 154). Through 
feelings we are involved in the process of grasping similarities 
between remote ideas, we participate in the intellect's discovery of 
a new meaning. Without it, we would probably fall into merely 
appreciating the fineness of the metaphorical construction, as 
Turbayne would have liked us to do.
Ricoeur then recognizes that, feelings "accompany and complete 
imagination as picturing relationships" (Ibid., 155). This aspect of 
feeling is what Northrop Frye, in The Anatomy of Criticism calls 
"mood". The mood is the consequence of us being affected by a poem as 
a whole, as a unique chain of words. Thus, the mood of that poem is
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the iconic representation of the poem being felt. Now, Ricoeur refers 
to metaphor as being a poem in miniature. If this is true, then 
seizing the metaphor is not a complete process without the element of 
feeling which is "the iconic as felt". (Ibid., 155)
Finally, Ricoeur talks about feelings as they bring their 
contribution to the split reference of poetic discourse. Through 
imagination thought can suspend its direct reference to reality as we 
have seen. Besides reproductive imagination, where thought just 
reproduces reality, there is productive imagination, where thought 
has the ability to produce something new. This way, in imagination, 
thought augments our possibilities to read reality. Correspondingly, 
feelings, Ricoeur says, "are ways of 'being-there', of 'finding' 
ourselves within the world ... Because of feelings we are 'attuned to' 
aspects of reality which cannot be expressed in terms of the objects 
referred to in ordinary language" (Ibid., 156).
To sum it all up, Ricoeur considers that a metaphor includes, 
besides its cognitive dimension, an imaginative and an emotional 
element as well. All of them are intimately connected. The full 
cognitive intent of a metaphor would be incomplete without the 
contribution of imagination and feelings. In Ricoeur's own words : 
"there is a structural analogy between the cognitive, the 
imaginative, and the emotional components of the complete 
metaphorical act and that the metaphorical process draws its 
concreteness and its completeness from this structural analogy and 
this complementary functioning" (Ibid., 157).
Ricoeur's theory of metaphor is often referred to as a tension 
theory of metaphor. The reason for employing the term "tension" is 
obvious if we take into account the fact that Ricoeur brings forward
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two levels of reference, as we saw when he analyzed the differences 
between Frege and Benveniste's approaches concerning this issue that 
make up the foundations for a split reference in which the 
metaphorical statement is rooted. Then, there are two different ways 
of looking at the concept of an image: there can be talk about the 
image as replica and the image as fiction and they both act together 
in a metaphor with one being surpassed by the other. Finally, 
feelings come onto the scene attached to and completing the 
metaphorical utterance. Moreover, the linguistic elements that enter 
into the makeup of a metaphor are connected by the copula "is". The 
copula itself should only be taken together with its correlate "is
not" because a metaphor points out not only the similarities between
remote ideas but also their differences, preserving the tension 
between them.
Through metaphor we discover a new creative dimension in 
language. Metaphor, as Ricoeur puts it, has an heuristic function. 
Metaphor relates to reality by bringing forward new aspects of it. By 
improving our language we are likely to discover in the world 
something that could not be previously described. Thus, metaphor does 
not mirror reality but it re-describes it, it makes it more diverse 
and fuller. And through that it changes our way of relating to it, it
changes "our way of dwelling in the world".
Lyall did not develop his ideas on metaphor to the extent that 
Ricoeur did. However, as shown above, there are similarities between 
his thought on the subject and Ricoeur's. Unlike Ricoeur, Lyall did 
not have at hand the findings of phenomenology, such as the 
importance of subjectivity in the attempt to describe the way the 
world makes itself present to awareness, or the idea of the
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importance of returning to the things in themselves. Thus Lyall did 
not have an incentive for walking in uncharted territory, preferring 
to stay on the path lighted by traditional European views on this 
matter. Nevertheless, he foresaw the importance of language and 
stressed the use of metaphorical language which, complemented by 
emotions in the imaginative state has the ability to open up new 
dimensions in our interaction with the world.
The same sort of connection is emphasized by David Abram in 
his book The Spell of the Sensuous (1997) where he asserts that:
At the heart of any language then, is the poetic
productivity of expressive speech. A  living
language is continually being made and remade, 
woven out of the silence by those who speak... And
this silence is that of our wordless
participations, of our perceptual immersion in 
the depths of an animate, expressive world.
(1997, 84)
By being immersed in the natural world we have the opportunity to 
improve our language, and metaphor is the best tool that we can use 
in order to achieve this.
The world, as Abram sees it, is animate and its "wild, 
participatory logic ramifies and elaborates itself in language" 
(Ibid., 84) . We cannot pick up a single phenomenon, as John Muir once 
said, without "finding it hitched to everything else" in the 
universe. Abram continues this same line of thought:
It is this dynamic, interconnected reality that 
provokes and sustains all our speaking, lending 
something of its structure to all our various 
languages. The enigmatic nature of language 
echoes and 'prolongs unto the invisible' the 
wild, interpenetrating, interdependent nature of 
the sensible landscape itself. (Ibid., 85)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
121
This means that everything is connected, everything is part of the 
immense unity which cannot be grasped by the rigid use language.
In sum, metaphor is of tremendous importance if we are to 
establish a relationship between human beings as language users and 
reality. The purpose of metaphorical language is neither to "improve 
communication, nor to ensure univocity in argumentation, but to 
shatter and to increase our sense of reality by shattering and 
increasing our language [...] With metaphor we experience the 
metamorphosis of both language and reality" (Ricoeur 1991, 85). We do
not use metaphors for the sake of communication, nor do we use them
as mere ornaments. Metaphors do not help us to reduce ambiguity or to 
attain univocity. Instead, they break apart the structures of 
language by bringing together remote ideas that, at the same time, 
exhibit similar and different traits, as in the metaphorical 
assertions that "Time is a river" and "Odysseus is a journey", etc.
Such assertions grasp kinship and build similarities on
dissimilarities. Moreover, metaphors change our way of being-in-the- 
world. They do not merely describe reality any longer. The reality 
they bring forth is completely new and unexpected. Metaphors do not 
imitate reality. Rather, they redescribe it, they re-present it 
through words. With the metaphorical assertion "Time is a river" we 
are prepared to understand time in a new way, as something 
continuously flowing and forever changing. Thus, reality becomes 
novel because we changed our way of relating to it.
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
An alder leaf, loosened by wind, is drifting out 
with the tide. As it drifts, it bumps into the 
slender leg of a great blue heron staring 
intently through the rippled surface, then drifts 
on. The heron raises one leg out of the water and 
replaces it, a single step. As I watch I, too, am 
drawn into the spread of silence. Slowly, a bank 
of clouds approaches, slipping its bulged and 
billowing texture over the earth, folding the 
heron and the alder trees and my gazing body into 
the depths of a vast breathing being, enfolding 
us all within a common flesh, a common story now 
bursting with rain.
David Abram
David Abram, in his much celebrated book The Spell of the 
Sensuous, seems to summarize the latent ideas present in Lyall's book 
Intellectr the Emotions and the Moral Nature. For Lyall human beings 
are part of the world in as much as they too like the rest of "what 
is" participate in Being. The intellect, being the eternal principle, 
connects us with God but is separated from Nature. The emotions, on 
the other hand, put us in touch, through phenomenal reality, with 
Being which is another name for God, at least in what concerns Lyall. 
Lyall was, first and foremost a religious person and it is only 
natural to find him talking about God and praising him, here and 
there, throughout the Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature.
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However, besides connecting with God through grace we can see God in 
His works. Regarding this alternative, Lyall, in the inaugural 
lecture at Free Church College, on the philosophy of mind, reminds 
us :
Perhaps, we are too apt to forget the claims of 
God in Nature, because of the superior 
manifestations of him in Grace. There is too 
great a tendency to disparage the one, because of 
the more overwhelming demonstrations of the 
other. It was not thus with the Psalmist. He 
looked up to the heavens which God made, to the 
moon and the stars which he had ordained, and he 
learned his lesson of piety from these. He 
rejoined in the poetic beauties of creation: and 
made them express his feelings of devotion and 
utter the language of the most spiritual 
experiences. And we believe the more scientific 
our acquaintance with God works, we shall see God 
more in them, we shall be brought more into 
immediate contact with the Divine Being - not 
with a law, or a principle, but with a personal 
God - we shall behold more to admire [...] God is 
obviously recognized both in nature and in grace.
(1853, 13)
Lyall recognized the importance of seeing God through His works, in 
Nature. Here I have not been concerned with the other possibility of 
connecting with God through grace but rather with trying to make the 
most out of what is left, namely Nature. This is why I think that 
David Abram's ideas are most useful, as he offers us an insight that 
comes from the phenomenological tradition, imbued with considerations 
about language and participation in a world where human beings are 
neither subordinated to, nor above Nature.
Thus, I will make use of the conclusions reached in the 
previous chapters in order to show that Lyall intuited avant la date 
the importance of being a human being in a more-than-human world.
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Looking back to Lyall's considerations on the imaginative 
state, we can see that is the place where he brings together both the 
intellect and the emotions. In the imaginative state we are able to 
commune with Nature because in this particular state we perceive 
analogies, we see beyond what is out there as an object, we 
"personify nature", we do not limit ourselves to just describing 
reality but we re-describe it through an extensive use of 
metaphorical language.
Moreover, Lyall would say that we empathize with Nature 
through our emotions, by grasping its concreteness and unity, in much 
the same way Abram does :
From the magician's, or phenomenologist' s, 
perspective that which we call imagination is 
from the first an attribute of the senses 
themselves; imagination is not a separate mental 
faculty (as we often assume) but is rather a way 
the senses themselves have of throwing themselves 
beyond what is immediately given, in order to 
make tentative contact with the other sides of 
things that we do not sense directly, with the 
hidden or invisible aspects of the sensible.
(Abram 1997, 58)
The idea that in imagination we "make contact with other sides of 
things" is similar to what Lyall thinks when he says that emotions 
and especially the emotion of love, "see" beyond particularities, 
beyond what is accidental and changeable, toward Being itself.
Ultimately, for Lyall as well as for Abram, "both the 
perceiving and the perceived being are of the same stuff [...] the 
perceiver and the perceived are interdependent and in some sense even 
reversible aspects of a common animate element, or Flesh, that is at 
once both sensible and sensitive" (Abram Ibid., 67) . Abram takes 
Flesh to mean what Merleau-Ponty meant when he used this term in his
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work The Visible and the Invisible. The Flesh is "the reciprocal 
presence of the sentient in the sensible and of the sensible in the 
sentient". It is the interconnectedness of the perceiver and of the 
perceivable world. These two cannot exist independently of each other 
because we can only sense our surroundings from, a particular 
perspective which implies that we extend our sentience in the 
surroundings. Moreover, it would be impossible to imagine a sentient 
subject completely separated from a "field of sensed phenomena".
For Lyall, as we saw before, when he talked about love, he 
considered that "every object, every being, shares in its exercise: 
it has selected no object for its exercise; but every object receives 
a part of its regard as it comes within its sphere. In its most 
absolute character, being is its object" (Lyall 1855, 408) . The same 
interconnectedness between us as sentient beings and the sensible 
surroundings is present here. We are capable of love and we love 
Being, regardless of the particularities in which it is expressed or 
of the changes which it might endure. Through love we are in touch 
with "what is", we ourselves, being part of it. Thus, Lyall's thought 
is not exclusively centered on God and man since this connection is 
established by the intellect alone. But we are only whole when the 
intellect and the emotions work together. Through emotions, however, 
we take a detour and see God expressed in personified Nature. Through 
imagination where the intellect and emotions meet, we have the 
opportunity to discover new ways of relating to Nature, by making it 
more complex and fuller. For St. Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153), 
for example. Nature was almost void of any significance since he is 
said to have travelled across the most beautiful landscapes without
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even noticing them as he was concerned exclusively with thoughts 
about his soul and God.
For Lyall, Nature cannot be avoided because we are part of it 
as it is part of us. Even though Lyall's work exhibits idealist 
features, he detaches himself from the general understanding of 
idealism, as he does not follow, for example, either Berkeley's or 
Hegel's ideas. This however, did not compel him to embrace a 
materialist point of view. He knew that the idealist tries to 
dissolve the tension between the I and the world by explaining the 
world as a mere projection of the mind, whereas the materialist 
submerges the I into the vast sea of matter.
So Lyall took a more balanced stance, asserting that both the I 
and the world exist but that they are connected by our emotions 
through which we are able to see nature as animate and as "full of 
life". However, Lyall does not see the world as Sartre, for example, 
saw it, when we are under the spell of emotions. Sartre, even though 
he emphasized the difference between the I and the world, stressed 
the tension that exists between the two, the tension that springs 
when the I tries to appropriate the world which, in its turn, opposes 
resistance. Thus, the I tries to make its own something that still 
remains "strange" and distant. Lyall avoids this "deception" because 
for him emotions grasp what is beyond the particular characteristics 
of the world: emotions grasp Being itself.
Ernst Breisach in his Introduction to Modern Existentialism 
writes about similar existentialist views on this matter:
Neither a denial of the reality of the world 
(idealist position) nor the denial of the 
uniqueness of man (materialist position) , nor a 
set of benevolent laws of nature nor Divine 
Providence can eliminate the fundamental fact of
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the human condition, that no miraculous harmony 
exists in the world and that to resolve the 
enormous tension between man and his world is 
beyond human power. What becomes audible in this 
tension is the echo of man's questions reflected 
from 'somewhere' , and human life at its best is 
this sounding of the depths. (1962, 203)
We can see now that Lyall's position differs from Sartre's in that he 
does not regard the relationship between human beings and the world 
as being under the sign of an unsurpassable tension. For him, both we 
and the world are part of Being. Emotions make this similarity 
visible to us.
Now, this relationship can and should be developed by 
augmenting and improving our language as well which gives us the 
chance to discover in the world something that could not be 
previously described. This is where Ricoeur's theory of metaphor is 
useful. Ricoeur does not consider metaphor to be just an ornament as 
it was traditionally understood. Au contraire, he talks about a 
metaphorical statement which implies that metaphors can be true, that 
they can refer to reality. In order to show that metaphors have the 
capability to reach reality, he had to reassess the issue of 
reference. There is a metaphorical reference, beside literal 
reference, Ricoeur considers, as there is a metaphorical 
interpretation beside literal interpretation. The reality to which 
metaphors refer is a richer reality, Ricoeur also had to distinguish 
between two types of imagination and stress the importance of the 
productive imagination. Imagination, for Ricoeur, produces an 
unexplored vision of reality. Finally, he had to draw on different 
ways in which the emotional element complements the metaphorical 
process. Imagination is always accompanied by an emotional element
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which represents a way of "finding ourselves" in the world, of "being 
there".
These themes from Ricoeur are common to Lyall even though 
admittedly Lyall does not develop a theory of metaphor. However, he 
makes extensive use of metaphorical constructions and discusses the 
intricate work of imagination although he does not produce an 
explanation or a thorough analysis of imagination which involves both 
the emotions and the intellect.
Where Lyall was mistaken was in considering the intellect to be 
separated from reality. Ricoeur showed that this should not be the 
case because metaphors, which are creations of our intellect, do not 
merely describe reality. Instead, metaphors re-describe it. They make 
it more diverse and fuller and thus they improve our relationship 
with it.
Something similar is expressed by Abram when he writes: "Only 
by overlooking the sensuous, evocative dimension of human discourse, 
and attending solely to the denotative and conventional aspect of 
verbal communication, can we hold ourselves apart from, and outside 
of, the rest of animate nature" (Ibid., 79).
Thus, we are constantly under the "spell of the sensuous" 
because we ourselves are sensuous beings. The intellect is not, as 
Lyall believed, divorced from reality, from Nature. As Abram puts it:
our senses disclose to us a wild-flowering 
proliferation of entities and elements, in which 
humans are thoroughly immersed. While this 
diversity of sensuous forms certainly displays 
some sort of reckless order, we find ourselves in 
the midst of, rather than on top of, this 
order...Does the human intellect, or 'reason', 
really spring us free from our inherence in the 
depths of this wild proliferation of forms? Or on 
the contrary, is the human intellect rooted in, 
and secretly borne by, our forgotten contact with
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the multiple nonhuman shapes that surround us?. 
(Ibid., 48-49)
The link of reason with reality goes deeper than Lyall considered. 
Even though he stressed the fact that our emotions have a cognitive 
value, that they represent the channel through which the intellect 
reaches the world, they are still not the only link.
Abram for one recognizes that through language, the intellect 
finds itself in the midst of things because:
We [...] learn our native language not mentally but 
bodily. We appropriate new words and phrases 
first through their expressive tonality and 
texture, through the way they feel in the mouth 
or roll off the tongue, and it is this direct, 
felt significance - the taste of a word or 
phrase, the way it influences or modulates the 
body - that provides the fertile, polyvalent 
source for all the more refined and rarefied 
meanings which that term may come to have for us...
Language, then, cannot be genuinely studied or 
understood in isolation from the sensuous 
reverberation and resonance of active speech.
(Ibid., 75)
But this reciprocity, this interdependence between language and the 
intellect, on the one hand, and perception and "sensuousness", on the 
other hand, has a downside for Lyall. If we are to place ourselves in 
Lyall's shoes we can see that he took the intellect to mean what it 
means in the Platonic tradition. It represents order and it is the 
eternal principle, and this forced him to define the surrounding 
world as a determinate set of objects to cut the conscious self off 
from the spontaneous life of Nature. "To define another being as an 
inert or passive object is to deny its ability to actively engage us 
and to provoke our senses; we thus block our perceptual reciprocity 
with that being" (Ibid., 56). Thus, by defining another being as a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
130
passive object, for the intellect the phenomenal world becomes just a 
world of shadows.
Trying to avoid interacting with an inert world, Lyall 
sprinkled metaphors on the dry, abstract language that he used to 
explain this and that concept or idea. For the same purpose he needed 
the input of emotions which represent the only accessible path to the 
animateness of the world. Abram explains that:
If we wish to describe a particular phenomenon 
without repressing our direct experience, then we 
cannot avoid speaking of the phenomenon as an 
active, animate entity with which we find 
ourselves engaged ... Only by affirming the 
animateness of perceived things do we allow our 
words to emerge directly from the depths of our 
ongoing reciprocity with the world". (Abram, 
idem, p. 56)
Inasmuch as we are part of the world, inasmuch as we and the world 
are "of the same stuff", we cannot simply disassociate from it, we 
cannot regard it from a purely objective perspective.
Lyall intuited that we are emotionally involved in the world. 
Our emotions, Lyall considers, represent our extension in the world. 
Through them we discover ourselves as participants in the world. This 
idea is rightfully emphasized by Armour and Trott in their analysis 
of Lyall's major work Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature. 
The way Lyall understood the balanced relation between reason and 
emotions compels Armour and Trott to consider him a representative of 
Canadian philosophy. However, for them, his work seems to be more a 
patchwork guilt of foreign ideas.
It was my goal here to show that Lyall's contribution is more 
significant than Armour and Trott estimated. Indeed, emotions connect 
us with reality. But so does our intellect through its activity of
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creating metaphors which Lyall uses throughout his work even though 
he does not offer a study of metaphor as such. However, metaphors 
themselves are not purely intellectual constructions. There is an 
emotional element that enters into their constitution as well. Thus, 
the link between emotions and reason becomes more evident. Their 
balance in Lyall's work is a strong example of the accommodâtionist 
use of reason.
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APPENDIX
Being Used, by Metaphor: The Fallacy of Taking a Metaphor Literally
Turbayne distinguishes between two sides of the metaphor which 
cast a Janus profile on it: on the one hand, it can be used to 
express the otherwise un-expressible; but, on the other hand, it can 
abuse its users. Metaphor abuses its users when the "make believe" is 
taken seriously. This is where one must be vigilant. Otherwise, the 
"make-believe" is transformed into "believe" and the "as if" loses 
its meaning and becomes "is". Thus, from enjoying the tension created 
by the metaphor one can easily end up, if one is not careful, 
dwelling in an unreal world. This is what happened to Descartes, for 
example.
What Descartes intended to do with his Mathesis Universalis was 
to "transfer the certainty of geometrical demonstration to the 
procedure of scientific discovery, that is, the certainty of 
synthesis to analysis" (Turbayne 1970, 38). What this means is that 
Descartes' quest for certainty had to take in the advantages of the 
mathematical method, "more geometrico".
Now, is this conjunction of scientific discovery and 
geometrical demonstration a valid one? According to Turbayne, it is 
not. Descartes engaged himself this in a sort-trespassing process. 
Unaware of the outcome of his quest, Descartes acted as if by saying 
that "man is a wolf", he actually believed that man was indeed a 
wolf.
Turbayne selects three cases of sort-trespassing where 
Descartes does not seem to comprehend the full implications of his 
arguments.
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1. The first case of sort-trespassing "is that of the deductive 
relation with the relation between events. The former relation 
belongs to procedure [...] The latter relation belongs to the process 
going on in nature" (Ibid., 45). Making use of deduction, Descartes 
was able to work with the theorems which were deduced from 
principles. "Principle and theorem were necessarily connected"
(Ibid., 46). Supposing the principles were true, and because the 
mathematical method was employed, as in a chain of reasoning, it 
would be expected for the theorems to be true and therefore to be put 
at work in the process of explaining the world. Which brings us to 
the next issue. "The principle of procedure that starts a 
demonstration is repeated in the 'active principle' that starts the 
causal process" (Ibid., 46). Thus, what Turbayne argues is that when 
Descartes thought about the fact that "physical causes produce the 
existence of their effects, and that the effects necessarily follow 
from the causes" (Ibid., 47) he was applying the procedural algorithm 
to the physical world or, as Turbayne metaphorically puts it "a 
prominent page of the recipe was mixed in with the stew" (Ibid., 47). 
This act of shifting what was found in one domain into the other, or 
of associating them until they became "necessarily connected" gave 
enough grounds for Descartes to affirm that nature can be subjected 
to the deductive method. Which, Turbayne considers, is a clear 
example of taking a metaphor literally.
2. The second case of the sort-trespassing detected by Turbayne 
in Descartes' system of thought is "the inadvertent identification of 
explanation with physical explanation and this with causal 
explanation, that is, the reduction of one to the other" (Ibid., 47). 
This means simply that Descartes thought the main preoccupation of 
physics to be that of discovering the laws governing the movement of 
the bodies and then, using these laws to account for their motion.
And this explanation was nothing other than a causal explanation 
which implies that events were actually caused by the "physical 
laws". One should not forget Descartes was determined to make use 
only of distinct and clear ideas as opposed to "obscure notions". In 
this case, the clear and distinct ideas were offered by entities such 
as: "bodies moving", "bodies at rest" and "external causes" or
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"resistance", where the former ones are nothing but the effects of 
the causes expressed by the latter ones. All along Descartes' 
explanation the word "principle" was used to designate both "the 
premise or statement of the law in the procedure and the active 
principle , the supposed cause in the process" (Ibid., 48). Thus, 
Descartes failed to see the difference between the physical 
explanation of phenomena and their theoretical explanation. The 
concept of force, used in theoretical explanations, is fallaciously 
ascribed to objects. "Something that belongs to persons or living 
things is ascribed to matter", Turbayne considers.
3. The third case of sort-trespassing involves the
unwarranted identification of deduction with 
computation or calculation or any other form of 
metrical reckoning or counting [„.] Because 
mathematical computation is constantly used in 
science, we must not regard it as a defining 
property. Because lines and angles are used to 
enormous advantage in optical demonstration [...] 
we must not therefore succumb to the tendency to 
think that explanation by means of lines and 
angles exhaust optical explanation. We might just 
as well say that mechanical explanations exhaust 
science or that we cannot set up a deductive 
system without using differential equations.
(Ibid., 49-50)
In Turbayne's view, the Mathesis Universalis need not be geometrical. 
What is to be taken and used from the method itself is the 
demonstration feature and not "the nature of the terms used in it". 
The "geometrical method" is valuable inasmuch as it uses 
demonstration, not inasmuch as it is geometrical. It does not matter 
if the terms pertain to the area of geometry or not, as long as the 
algorithm followed is the one of demonstration.
Turbayne concludes that: "If we are victimized, then we confuse 
devices of procedure with the actual process of nature, and thus, 
unknowingly insinuate metaphysics"(Ibid., 56).
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